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3 4 I.  Introduction by President Santer 
and Commissioner de Silguy 
Many participants in  the Round Table made the point quite forcefully that economic 
and monetary union was essential for ensuring peace and prosperity in  Europe. But 
over and above the declarations of principle, the Round Table generated extremely 
useful input for framing and implementing the communication strategy for the Euro. 
It enabled three main conclusions to be drawn: 
(I) the Euro concerns all  European citizens. We must begin  here and now prepar-
ing them for its  introduction; 
(2) the communication effort must focus  on a few  simple  ideas, with a decentral-
ized, interactive, well-organized and progressive campaign; 
(3) the scale of the task is  considerable and requires everyone to play their part. 
Preparing public opinion  in  Europe 
Introduction of the Euro is  an  unprecedented step in  the course of European his-
tory. It is  essential that individuals be properly prepared for a change of this magni-
tude, which will  affect each and every one of them in  their daily lives: If the change 
is  to be accepted, it must be convincing and attract popular support. The commu-
nication strategy must therefore: 
- disseminate precise, concrete information which responds to people's concerns 
and makes them aware of the advantages of the Euro; 
- create the necessary climate of confidence for the changeover to the Euro. 
The opinion  poll  presented at the  Round Table  points to a  substantial  need  for 
information: 80%  of people  consider themselves  under-informed  and  91%  are  in 
favour of an  information campaign. Such figures  reflect the scale of the communica-
tion challenge. 
Efforts will also have to be made as a matter of priority to allay people's fears. Many 
members of the public are anxious, for example, about risks associated with cur-
rency conversions or about preservation of the value  of their savings.  In  several 
Member States, monetary reform is  linked  in  people's minds with memories of the 
5 value of savings being wiped out.  Through simple, convincing messages, the Member 
States and the Community institutions will have to highlight the benefits which the 
Euro will bring for the economy as  a whole, for businesses, for consumers and  for 
individuals. 
Communication is  about explaining, justifying, convincing and getting things moving. 
The task is a huge one. No time should be  lost in framing and implementing a com-
munication campaign  on the Euro. 
The  guiding principles 
of a communication strategy 
In  the  light of these  requirements, the  Round Table  has  clearly  identified  three 
essential  principles  for the communication  strategy: decentralization, partnership 
and  a methodical approach. 
Closeness to the citizen: a decentralized campaign 
The  Round Table  has  shown that needs, fears  and  expectations vary widely from 
one country to another and  from one section of the population to another. There 
can be  no question of imposing standard slogans from Brussels. Communication on 
the Euro should be guided by a spirit of decentralization. Member States have prime 
responsibility  in  this  area:  they  should  resolutely  join  in  the  information  effort, 
focusing on the most important and  most sensitive issues in  each  country. Regional 
and  local authorities also have an  important role to play. In Brussels, the task will be 
to ensure that all  these initiatives are consistent and to provide those involved in 
the campaign  with the necessary basic  data and  arguments. 
Partnership: an interactive campaign 
This is the corollary of decentralization: communication must be interactive so that 
the information flows are both bottom-up (questions are asked  by members of the 
public) and  top-down (they are given the answers they need). This can  be  done by 
creating, at local, national and European levels, a network bringing together the pub-
lic  authorities, trade  associations, consumer organizations, employers  and  unions 
and, in general, all the information multipliers. 
Approach: a well-organized and progressive campaign 
The introduction of a new currency will directly affect all citizens in their daily lives, 
whatever their age. It will take time to inform all  members of the public fully and 
properly.  Through lack of sufficient preparation, the changeover from the old to the 
new French  franc  in  1960 proved a difficult process. On the other hand, decimal-
6 ization  of sterling in  1971  was  a success  because  it was  preceded  by  a five-year 
information campaign. Introduction of the Euro will be successful only if the expla-
nation effort is  kept up until 2002. 
The Euro will be  Europe's currency from  I January  1999. However, it will not be  in 
general  use  until  2002.  Banks  and  consumers  will  not therefore  have  the  same 
length of time in  which to prepare themselves. The communication campaign  must 
take account of this difference by building up gradually in  intensity. For example, it 
will be able to concentrate initially on the detailed preparation of the financial sec-
tor, combining this with more general information for individuals on the justification 
for and  benefits  of the Euro. It will then  be  able to concentrate on the practical 
preparations for the changeover for the public at large  (introduction of coins and 
banknotes, etc.). 
Securing the  involvement 
of all the  parties concerned 
The Round Table  provided useful insight into some of the tasks to be  entrusted to 
the different parties involved. 
The Community institutions 
It is  essential that the Community institutions work together. To  decide what mes-
sages  should be given priority and to plan their dissemination and the allocation of 
the necessary budgetary resources, the Commission and  the European Parliament 
will set up a joint working party. 
The  Round  Table  conclusions  have  identified  a  number  of areas  in  which  the 
Community institutions should take future action: 
- they  will  have  to prepare  information  material  and  basic  messages  for  busi-
nesses, schools and  the general public; 
- they will be  able  to help  Member States  launch  their national  communication 
campaigns  by  providing financial assistance; 
- they will be  able to assist the other parties involved in  carrying out their tasks 
by adopting from the outset a multiannual communication strategy; 
- finally, a coordinating body has  to be  set up  at Community level. Lightweight in 
structure, this  body will  ensure  that the arrangements  are  consistent overall. 
National steering bodies and Community institutions will exchange information 
on the state of progress of the campaigns in the Member States and on the tech-
nical preparations at both national and  Community level. 
7 The Member States 
The prime responsibility for framing and conducting the communication campaign 
will  lie with the Member States. This has to be so because they are best placed to 
assess shifts in  public opinion in  each country and because they direct the activities 
of the public authorities, whose role will  be crucial in  the communication process. 
In  the light of the national initiatives which are already well  in  hand and which were 
described at the Round Table workshops, and in keeping with the conclusions of the 
European  Council  meeting in  Madrid, the Member States will  have  four principal 
tasks: 
- tailoring the information to the different national situations; 
- immediately setting up a national steering body responsible for establishing links 
with the Community institutions, central  banks and  the two sides of industry 
within the country andfor coordinating the measures taken by the various pub-
lic authorities; 
- training the staff of administrative departments and  adapting the national  leg-
islative framework; 
- using the education system to train pupils  and students and, where necessary, 
members of the teaching profession. 
The other parties concerned 
The other players in  the economy are both the essential recipients of the informa-
tion communicated and indispensable opinion formers. 
A number of recommendations can be made according to the sector in  question: 
- the banks  and  the financial  sector must  immediately  begin  intensive  internal 
preparations; 
- internal discussions must begin within firms  on the consequences of the move 
to the Euro. Training and consultation are two key components of the process. 
Preparations for the changeover will have to be made together with customers 
and suppliers. Chambers of commerce, industry and trade, agricultural federa-
tions, trade unions  and  training organizations are key  channels for  promoting 
dialogue and  disseminating information. The legal  and accountancy professions 
will  have  a  central  role to play,  particularly  in  their dealings  with  small  busi-
nesses and private individuals; 
- the whole of the retail trade - both small  and large scale - has  the time to 
prepare very carefully for the change. Dialogue must begin between the distrib-
utive trades and consumers.The RoundTable has demonstrated the importance 
of well-designed  dual  display  of prices. This will  have to be  in  place sufficiently 
8 early for consumers to accustom themselves to the new price scale; at the same 
time, the cost of the transition must be kept as  low as  possible. Furthermore, 
the retail  sector will  have  to explain  clearly to consumers the pricing  policy 
adopted on the introduction of the Euro, indicating, for example, how the round-
ing of selling prices will  be effected on the basis of the new parity. 
* 
*  * 
Dialogue, transparency and a readiness to take account of the concerns and expec-
tations of individuals are the best means of ensuring that citizens receive the infqr-
mation they need and of answering the legitimate questions they are asking ab?ut 
the changeover to the Euro. 
Successful introduction of the Euro will  ensure that the single market lasts and that 
European  integration will  continue. Economic and  political  challenges are closely 
interrelated: future  progress  in  European  integration  will  depend  largely  on  the 
achievement of monetary union. 
Yves-Thibault de Silguy 
European Commissioner 
Jacques Santer 
President of the. European Commission 
9 10 2.  Summary of the-debate 
2.1.  Workshop  1: Focus  on  the  consumer 
I.  The  workshop  on  consumers'  attitudes  to  the  single  currency  was  lively, 
animated and useful. It produced a clearer definition of the specific expectations of 
consumers and their fears. At the same time it provided various ingredients for a 
communication strategy intended to facilitate the Euro's release into circulation. 
2.  For the consumer, the single currency will  be the physical and concrete embod-
iment of his  belonging  to the European  Union. This  currency, which  is  a  way  of 
expressing what he has  earned from  his  work, must be a sign  of confidence in  the 
future  and  a  symbol  of pride. As  Mrs  Bonino  reminded  us  in  her introduction, 
Europeans joined forces  in  the Middle Ages to build cathedrals, and this gave them 
a very strong feeling of coming together to build something new. The Euro will, in  a 
way, be the first cathedral of modern Europe. 
3.  Although  the emphasis  varied, the speakers, aware  of the problems of con-
sumers, demonstrated a genuine desire to cooperate in  order to smooth the way 
for the Euro's introduction. Several of the suggestions made deserve to be taken up 
and studied in  greater detail. 
4.  For it to be effective, the information campaign must have two separate facets, 
one devoted to heightening awareness and providing explanations and the other to 
formulating answers to the specific questions raised by consumers. 
5.  The first  facet  should  make  it  possible  for  Europe's  image  to  be  enhanced 
appreciably. It  must be  clearly demonstrated that neither the cultural identity nor 
the security of individuals is  in danger but that, on the contrary, the European Union 
will  help them to meet the challenges facing  them. The citizens of Europe wish  to 
see concrete examples of closer cooperation: the introduction of the Euro will  be 
one such example. 
As for enhancing the image of the European Union, it was stressed that it  is  very 
important for the citizen to believe in  the effectiveness of all  Community policies, 
and not just economic and monetary policy. 
If the credibility of the information is  to be guaranteed, the risks and disadvantages 
associated with the introduction of the single  currency must be addressed as  well 
as  the advantages.  In  this  connection, people  must be  reminded that the efforts 
demanded, and in  particular the budgetary restrictions, have a very precise purpose: 
to restore order to a situation which has deteriorated in  the past so that the Euro 
II can  be introduced on solid foundations. Far from  being a source of problems, the 
Euro  itself is  actually part of the solution  making  it  possible to stimulate growth, 
employment and stability.  The fear that jobs will  be lost because of the establish-
ment of monetary union  can  be allayed  by  highlighting, with  the help  of striking 
examples, the job losses which have taken place in  recent times in  the wake of tur-
moil on the exchanges. 
Above all  when the choice is  made of the countries that will  be in  the first group 
introducing the Euro in  1999, the single currency must not become the symbol of 
the winners and of the strongest at the expense of the countries not yet satisfying 
the convergence criteria. 
6.  The second facet of the information campaign concerns the practical problems 
which consumers will encounter when the changeover to the single currency takes 
place. There are numerous sources of concern, and these must be allayed thought-
fully,  methodically and  in  close coordination with the others involved  in  economic 
life, more especially the administrations and banks and, to a lesser extent, large com-
panies and small  businesses. 
7.  If information campaigns are to be effective, it is  necessary to identify: 
- target groups; 
-groups which will  disseminate information; 
- information carriers; 
- the timing of information. 
8.  Target  groups  must be chosen so that the information  process is  not too uni-
form and thus effective. Information should not only be tailored to the countries to 
which  it is  directed but must also take account of the nature of the problem being 
addressed and the characteristics of the target groups concerned. Several  partici-
pants  stressed the need for transparent information; it was  emphasized  that the 
presentation of information is  as  important as  its  content. 
- It  is  clear  that information  cannot  be  conveyed  in  the same  way  in  all  the 
Member States without taking account of both the monetary culture of each 
country and its chances of participating from the outset in  the establishment of 
the single  currency. This  is  why  subsidiarity  in  the field  of information  is  very 
important. 
- The nature of the problems and concerns is  also important. In  his  roles as con-
sumer, saver, borrower, tourist, importer of goods from abroad, etc., the citizen 
requires different information.  He  must find  the information which  is  relevant 
to each of these problems, and that information must be clearly spelt out and 
not hidden away  in  some amorphous package. 
12 - The actual nature of the target groups also governs the approach to be taken: 
the weakest groups, such as  the handicapped (blind), the socially excluded and 
the elderly have particular problems which do not necessarily concern the pop-
ulation as a whole. Whereas the average citizen. will  generally find  the informa-
tion he needs fairly  easily through the traditional channels (newspapers, book-
lets, radio, television, banks), these groups require very special attention if  one 
or more of them are not to be excluded. 
9.  While young  people  form  a  very  diverse group, they also  demand  a  special 
approach because of their own specific characteristics: the language and the infor-
mation tools and· techniques have  to be adapted to the specific  problems of the 
young. The messages must be carried in  magazines for young people rather than in 
the economic press, which is  specialized and too intellectual for the average young 
person. It  is  also  important for young people to pass on their own messages: no 
information for young people without their direct involvement. 
I  0.  Women too have their specific problems. While it is  true that their functions 
make women a relatively disparate group (teachers, businesswomen, mothers), they 
are, in  all  the roles they perform, the main  consumers in  society. The representa-
tives of women's groups are proposing to assess the specific needs and demands of 
women. The feeling  of being routinely excluded from  centres of political  decision-
making makes women sceptical. Without efforts to remedy this democratic deficit, 
even the best ofinformation campaigns will  never win  their support. 
I I.  The identification of communicator groups or groups disseminating informa-
tion is also important. These include young people, teachers, women, artists and all 
public- or private-sector employees  whose duties  bring them  into fairly  regular 
contact with the general public. 
12.  Young people are undoubtedly a prime target because the multiplier effect is 
assured. They are tomorrow's decision-makers, they are receptive to change  and 
they ensure the permanence of the system. They must be given  a clear message, 
with more emphasis on quality than on quantity (but not with undue emphasis being 
placed on the convergence criteria), and they must be  involved  in  the campaign as 
much as  possible. 
13.  The role of teachers also  deserves emphasis. To  begin  with, teachers them-
selves have  to be convinced of the advantages of the Euro if they are subsequently 
to put over the message to their students. Suggestions must be made for the vari-
ous levels  (primary, secondary, higher education); education experts should then be 
given the job of putting those suggestions into practice. It  is  important to establish 
a link with  European education programmes which already exist, e.g. Socrates and 
Leonardo. At a time when the audiovisual  sector is  expanding fast, it  is  clear that 
audiovisual aids will  have to be used. 
14.  The confidence deficit can also be filled  by calling on artists and artistic: estab-
lishments that generally play a particularly valuable role in  the communication field 
(pop music, museums, etc.).The role of women as the focal  point of the family  must 
also  be  recognized. This  leaves  all  the occupations which are in  almost per:manent 
13 contact with consumers, e.g. banks, post offices, trade unions, mutual societies and 
municipal authorities. Some training, even if it is only rudimentary, should enable the 
employees concerned to foster confidence, especially among the most vulnerable 
groups. 
Small  businesses  will also  have  a key  role to play. They not only depend on infor-
mation tailored to their size  and  their resources, but they have to play a vital role 
in  the process of communicating with the citizen as  a consumer. 
15.  Apart from identifying target groups, it is  important to find, in  close coopera-
tion with information professionals, the most appropriate channels  for conveying 
information. Booklets, media (press, radio and  television) and  information technol-
ogy must play  an  important role. Nevertheless, it would be  a mistake to disregard 
the direct, straightforward contact between information-providers and  consumers. 
In  this context, the role of opinion polls was  examined in greater depth. Polls  help 
not only to pinpoint the issues of most interest to citizens; they also provide more 
information about the attitudes and  reasons  for misgivings on the part of many of 
those questioned who reply in  vague  terms that they are 'fairly favourable to' the 
single  currency. This  is  a group whose support is  too shaky not to give  cause  for 
concern. 
16.  Particular stress  was  placed  on  the  dual  display of prices  as  a good way  of 
familiarizing the consumer with the new scale  of prices. All those involved in  eco-
nomic life agree on its usefulness, but there are wide differences of opinion as  to 
how it should be organized (should it be compulsory or not, over what period, and 
what should  be  the  practicalities?). As  for the  role  of public  administrations, it 
is  generally  accepted  that public  utility prices  should  be  shown  side  by  side  in 
national currency and in  Euros fairly early on in the transition process. 
17.  The timing of information should guarantee that it is  effective. All information 
which is not communicated at the right time is worthless, if not counterproductive. 
It is  essential not to overload the consumer with information. In many cases, infor-
mation turns out to be  unnecessary, will  increase  doubts among consumers  and 
sow confusion in their minds. 
18.  Some apposite comments made during the workshop: 
- a European  Union does  not yet exist as  regards  views  on the introduction of 
the Euro; 
- it is  no use  organizing general  information campaigns; target groups  must be 
selected; 
- undue emphasis is being laid on the means, with insufficient attention being paid 
to the ends of EMU and of the single currency; 
- the desire  to provide too much  information  must  be  resisted; the  emphasis 
should be  on the quality, rather than the quantity, of information; 
14 - too much  legislation  must be  avoided  when the single  currency is  introduced; 
Europe cannot become a labyrinth of regulations; 
- information must be tested before being released to the general public. 
2.2.  Workshop  II: Focus  on  banking, 
financial  services  and enterprises 
I.  This workshop provided an  important occasion for banks and enterprises to 
debate the consequences of the introduction of the Euro, and in particular the com-
munication  challenges they will  face. The importance of the private sector in  the 
changeover process was repeatedly emphasized. Numerous speakers remarked that 
banks and enterprises will  be at the front-line of the changeover, given that they will 
be among the first 'consumers of the Euro'. Moreover, banks and the retail sector 
will  in  effect introduce citizens to the Euro via their bank accounts and their daily 
transactions. It is  imperative, therefore, that enterprises and banks be fully prepared 
so that they can become ambassadors for the Euro. 
2.  Setting the scene for the debate, the Chairman, Mr Brunowsky, pointed out that 
the private sector throughout Europe is  very much  in  favour of the single curren-
cy. He drew attention to the results of a survey by Deutsche Bank which highlights 
the prevailing information deficit, particularly among small and medium-sized enter-
prises  (SMEs).  He  stressed  the  need  for  the  EMU  communication  campaign  to 
achieve a better marketing of the Euro. 
3.  Greater _political  commitment to the EMU  project was  demanded  by  several 
participants, who stressed that political  uncertainty was  acting as  a brake on the 
launch of preparations. Commitments and decisions, once taken, must be adhered 
to. They should  not be  subject to chopping and  changing.  In  addition, premature 
communication of non-definitive decisions should be avoided as this would lead to 
the unnecessary waste of an  enterprise's time and resources and could easily  ~en­
erate a considerable negative backlash against the entire EMU  project. 
4.  Statements alone will not suffice to convince the private sector to begin prepa-
rations. Signals must be backed up  with tangible actions at all  levels, from  European 
institutions right down to local authorities. In  particular, national central banks have 
a leadership role to play, since they are respected national institutions and the pub-
lic  have faith  in  their ability to preserve the value of their currency. Four credibility 
raising measures were cited by several speakers during the proceedings: 
- early agreement on. the Regulation  on the status of  the  single currency; 
- measures to guarantee the continuity of  contracts; 
15 - decisions on the technical specifications of notes and coins, as well as a decision 
on other technical standards of the Euro; 
- the establishment of national steering committees to oversee the introduction of 
the Euro. 
5.  Participants in  the workshop reflected upon the need to improve the credibil-
ity of the EMU  project among the public at large and devoted considerable time to 
discussing broad messages which could form  part of a communications campaign. 
The campaign, however, must be timed carefully and not peak too early. Suggested 
key messages and approaches to the communications campaign  included: 
- explain to citizens the reasons why we are moving to EMU, stressing the many 
practical advantages for their daily  lives  as  well  as political  motivations; 
- provide reassurance about the many concerns which people have, in  particular 
about the ability  of the Euro to preserve the purchasing  power of long-term 
investments and  pensions; 
- emphasize that EMU  is  pro-growth: investment will  rise  as  a  result of lower 
interest rates which, in  turn, should lead to higher growth and employment; 
- argue that national currencies are not disappearing but rather are evolving to 
the.European level; 
- communication strategies should adopt a 'bottom-up' approach  based  on the 
demands and needs of the audience in  question. One suggestion was to estab-
lish telephone hot-lines; 
- special attention should be given  to the issue of small  cross-border payments. 
People are likely to think that a single currency means that all  payments in  Euro 
will  be as  cheap and quick as  .. domestic payments during the transitional period. 
They could easily feel  cheated if these payments are still  as  difficult as they are 
today or if companies levy a surcharge for using the Euro; 
- special efforts should be made for the most vulnerable members of society such 
as the old, the blind and the poorly educated. 
6.  The impact of EMU  on employment was identified  as  an  issue of major con-
cern. Although EMU should promote overall economic growth, thus leading to high-
er employment, it will  impact on some sectors more than others. Trade union  rep-
resentatives expressed concern about the irT)pact  on those currently employed in 
foreign  exchange dealings among EU  currencies. They called for the impact of EMU 
on employment to be studied in  more detail. 
7.  Regarding  the communications  actions -required  of enterprises, the  primary 
role of public administrations was emphasized. Most enterprises will  provide infor-
mation  to the customers on issues  related to their business  activities. However, 
16 they cannot  be  expected to be  public  information  offices  or act as  conduits for 
political ideas. 
8.  Enterprises will face  major communication challenges both internally with staff 
and  externally  vis-c'J-Vis  suppliers  and  customers.  Banks  and  non-financial  enter-
prises  should use all  resources at their disposal. Organizations representing indus-
try, trade unions and professional bodies all  have a crucial role to play. In particular, 
business  leaders - chairmen and  chief executives - should  take a high  personal 
profile in  the public debate, explaining to the general public the need for EMU and 
the single currency. 
9.  Staff  training  is  the  most pressing  of the  communications  challenges  facing 
enterprises relating to the Euro. Staff must be  fully informed about its introduction 
so that they are capable of planning and implementing the necessary technical meas-
ures. The initial focus of attention should be  on finance  personnel and  staff dealing 
with information technology. Such training could be of assistance to people in their 
own daily lives, since as  individuals they will have concerns of their own about the 
introduction of the Euro. A great deal of training will be required for staff who have 
contact with the general public, especially in  banks  and  in  the retail sector. As  one 
participant stated, they will be front-line 'ambassadors of the Euro'. Another partici-
pant argued  that proper training will render these  people into 'individual beacons 
of light in  these complex issues'. 
I 0.  Enterprises will face  a major communications challenge of explaining the sin-
gle  currency to their clients. The general  public will inevitably harbour suspicions 
about hidden price increases when faced  with new prices in Euros. Companies will 
need to consider how to explain these pricing policies to their customers. 
II.  SMEs will face  particular problems associated with the changeover, given that 
they have  more limited access to financial  resources and  skilled personnel. Several 
representatives  of  SMEs  called  for  public  authorities  to  develop  specific  pro-
grammes to assist them with technical  aspects  of the changeover and  to provide 
specific information programmes targeting their needs. 
2.3.  Workshop  Ill: 
Focus  on  public administrations 
The workshop on  public administrations threw a great deal  of light on  the work 
that remains to be done in  order to ensure that the Euro is  introduced successful-
ly according to the timetable adopted by the European Council in Madrid. The dis-
cussions which took place on 22 January under the chairmanship of MrAndriessen, 
17 President of the Euro  Institute, and  Mr Dauzier, Chairman and  Managing  Director 
of Havas, made it possible to pinpoint some important aspects of what the future 
users  of the  Euro  expect from  the  public  sector and  to  sketch  out an  initial 
response to those expectations. 
What the future users of  the Euro expect 
from the public administrations 
The workshop was attended by some 130  people from very different walks of life 
(bankers, public relations consultants, journalists, members of parliament, represen-
tatives of consumers and savers, national and local officials, students}.lt revealed the 
extent of the needs created by the introduction of the Euro among European citi-
zens and operators. The public sector has  a decisive  role to play  in  responding to 
their doubts and queries. Future users called on the public administrations: 
- to provide a legal and technical framework that will  ensure a smooth transition 
from the national currencies to the Euro; 
- to disseminate  among  users  clear and  readily  understandable  messages  pre-
senting the advantages and practical difficulties of changing currency; 
- to provide information not only for the countries which are most likely to take 
part in  EMU from  1998, but also more generally for all  citizens of the European 
Union, as  everyone will  be affected  by the changeover (e.g. when travelling to 
other Member States), and for partners outside the EU  (in America, Asia, etc.); 
- to give a dynamic presentation of the process leading up to EMU, which cannot 
be reduced simply to a question of implementing national deficit-reduction poli-
cies  (necessary in  any  event)  but forms  part of a  broader European  idea: 'the 
Euro is  not an end in  itself, but a means towards an  end'; 
- to provide practical training for civil servants who deal with the public to ensure 
that they  are  properly informed  about the arrangements for  introducing the 
Euro and putting it into circulation; 
- to facilitate  the exchange  of experience on preparations for  the changeover 
between  operators at both  national  and  European  level  in  order to achieve 
economies of scale, thereby minimizing adjustment costs and periods; 
- to encourage the dissemination of information which is comprehensive, tailored 
to the target audience and progressive in  line with the introduction timetable. 
In  response to these varied and  at times conflicting expectations, the administra-
tions represented began to formulate ideas for a common approach. 
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involved in  the introduction of the Euro 
Given the extent of the communication gap with regard to the transition to the sin-
gle currency, the public sector has a key  responsibility for the material and  psycho-
logical success of the changeover. Public operators have set themselves thinking and 
have begun to organize themselves with a view to promoting an  effective approach 
to providing information on a coordinated basis. Certain principles and  some con-
crete activities have already been put forward. 
- At Community level, the Commission  (Mr Oreja and  Mr de  Silguy)  intends to 
impart momentum and to check the consistency of information provided by the 
national authorities, in  strict compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This 
means: 
•  establishing an  image and  introducing a 'common language' for information on 
the  single  currency. More specifically, this  will  involve  preparing  a stock of 
common messages  on  EMU  and  the Euro which the Commission will make 
available  to Member States  and  operators via  the appropriate media  (data-
bases, Internet, newsletters, etc.); 
•  setting up an  ad  hoc working party to act as  a forum for exchanging informa-
tion and  experience in the field of communication on the changeover. 
- At national  level, some  Member States  intend to embark here and  now on a 
long-term ( 1996-2002) communication effort based on progressive information 
campaigns, e.g. in  Germany and  France (Mr Stark, Mr Jolivet), and to begin  set-
ting up  information structures allowing dialogue with all  potential user groups. 
The  subsidiarity  principle  should  apply  in  full;  it should  make  it possible  to 
ensure  that  operators  shoulder  their  responsibilities  as  part  of a  complex 
process  in  which the public  authorities will  have  to provide reliable  technical 
data in  time to enable the necessary preparations to be  made. 
- At Community, national and  local  level, identical messages  need to be  prepared 
on EMU  and  the Euro. These  messages  could, where necessary, be  adapted to 
the national context or to prevailing economic conditions but should form part 
of a Union-wide common approach to questions to do with the single  curren-
cy. 
* 
*  * 
To sum up, the role of public administrations in the communication strategy for the 
Euro will be crucial to the success of the changeover. It is also a complex one, since 
it involves several interdependent tasks: providing a stable legal and technical frame-
work, training civil  servants, preparing the necessary adjustments to management 
systems, and formulating clear, positive and timely messages for users. It is high time 
to begin making the necessary preparations for a medium-term public communica-
tion strategy for the Euro in order to ensure a smooth transition between now and 
the year 2002. 
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3. I.  General conclusions 
Following the work of the three workshops, the Round Table proposes that the fol-
lowing general  principles  be adopted  by  the authorities responsible for providing 
information on the introduction of the Euro: 
I.  The communication process relating to the move to the single currency must 
begin  immediately, given the scenario for its  introduction adopted by the European 
Council in  Madrid, and in  particular the timetable announced. 
2.  The communication of information on the introduction of the Euro concerns 
all the categories of users of the future European currency (banks, enterprises, pub-
lic administrations, consumers, etc.). It must be based first and foremost on decen-
tralized operational units  best able to deal  effectively  with  the economic aspects 
and citizens of the European Union. This  is  why the subsidiarity principle must play 
a full  part at both national and  business levels.  Responsibility for taking  the com-
munication measures necessitated by such a complex operation lies primarily with 
the private sector and the Member States. 
3.  The  Community  institutions  (Council,  Parliament,  Commission,  European 
Monetary Institute) and the Member States will  have  to monitor the overall con-
sistency of the communication measures taken  by  the parties concerned in  con-
nection  with  the move  to the Euro  and  ensure strict compliance  with  the sub-
sidiarity principle. 
4.  The communication of information  concerning the Euro should be organized 
on a permanent and  professional basis  in  accordance with the strict management 
rules governing a project of this scale, particularly as  regards the consistency of the 
measures taken and the proper allocation of the available  resources. 
S.  The communication of information on the introduction of the Euro should be 
transparent, continuous and progressive in  accordance with the content of the var-
ious  stages of the scenario and  should  be adapted to the separate needs of the 
users of the future single currency. These needs will  have to have been identified in 
advance through detailed consultations and surveys. 
6.  At a qualitative level, the information presented to the future users of the Euro 
will  be the better for being complete, direct and simple. The priority aim  will  be to 
facilitate  low adjustment costs and  to promote acceptance of the new  European 
currency by the public at large. In general, this information will  have to be directed 
20 to the citizen  in  all  facets  of his  activity (consumer, taxpayer, wage-earner, unem-
ployed person, person insured under the social security system, voter, etc.). 
7.  The communication of information on the introduction of the Euro has a major 
dimension outside the European Union. It will have to concentrate on showing how 
the introduction of the  Euro will make a significant contribution to greater inter-
national monetary stability and  hence to world growth. It will be directed especial-
ly at trading partners, private operators and individuals in  non-Union countries and 
provide easy  access  to the general  and  practical  information connected with the 
change of currency unit. 
On the  basis  of the general  principles  set out above, certain  practical  measures 
could be taken very quickly. For example: 
- the setting-up, on the initiative of each  Member State and according to its insti-
tutional organization, of a national  body responsible for steering the move to 
the Euro, which would have the task in particular of drawing up a plan for adapt-
ing the various sectors concerned; 
- the launching of national information campaigns adopted by each  Member State 
with the support of the Community institutions concerned; 
- the rapid  provision for users  of the technical specifications of notes and  coins 
(as  early as  1998) so  as  to give the Euro, as  quickly as  possible, physical  charac-
teristics by which it can  be  identified; 
- the setting-up at Community level of a specialist group involving the Community 
institutions and Member States concerned: it would have the medium-term task 
of safeguarding the consistency of the communication strategies concerning the 
move to the single  currency, particularly within the framework of the national 
adaptation  plans. This  group  should  be  set  up  as  soon  as  possible  and  be 
requested to produce an  initial report by the end  of June; 
- the continuation of the discussions initiated in the Round Table workshops with 
the major currency-user categories on a national, sectoral or Community basis; 
- the launching of measures tailored to specific user groups (consumer organiza-
tions, the disadvantaged, the elderly or the handicapped)  or to groups  in  the 
economic sphere (SMEs) that may encounter particular difficulties as a result of 
the move to the Euro, with a view to identifying their individual  needs  and  to 
devising appropriate information measures; 
- the supply of  precise and comprehensible information progressively and in good 
time for users of the future single  currency on certain technical arrangements 
arising from the scenario adopted by the European Council in Madrid (decimal-
. ization of the Euro, technical specifications,the legal  status of the Euro, etc.) as 
the work undertaken  under the auspices  of the  Community institutions pro-
ceeds. 
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3.2.1.  Workshop 1: Focus on the consumer 
Further advances of the European Union require the confidence of citizens in  their 
capacity as voter, taxpayer, wage-earner, unemployed person and consumer. 
The successful introduction of the Euro presupposes that: 
- the consumer will  be fully  aware of the benefits of EMU  in  general and of the 
single currency in  particular, 
- the consumer will  be given  satisfactory replies to practical questions he raises, 
and 
- access to information will  be easy, its presentation clear and its formulation tai-
lored to the characteristics of the various countries and  consumer groups for 
which it is  intended. 
Benefrts of  EMU  in general and of  the  single currency in  particular 
The single  currency is  an  element of economic and  monetary union.  In  order to 
facilitate its introduction, it is therefore essential first of all to improve the image of 
that union. To that end, the national and Community authorities will  seek to show 
that the additional economic reforms imposed on the public  are linked to adapta-
tion of the economic system, to growing internationalization of markets and to the 
ageing population structure: they are not principally concerned with participation in 
EMU and the single currency. In addition, the representatives of the European Union 
in  the member countries have to organize themselves to counter the arguments of 
the opponents of monetary union. 
The process of educating the public about the Euro cannot take place solely via the 
banking sector, but will  have to use several approaches. To  this end the creation of 
special  information  tools  has  been  suggested  (newspaper,  direct  contacts  with 
young people, etc.). 
Without prior information, the consumer may  initially  fail  to perceive the direct 
benefits of the single currency, such as the greater ease of travelling abroad, and may 
overlook the more fundamental gains. It  is  for the other economic agents  (public 
administrations, banks, enterprises) to provide him with appropriate information. 
Lastly, it is  necessary to demonstrate the special qualities of the Euro- a curren-
cy which will  be based on sound economic foundations - and always to set these 
qualities  in  the context of employment. 
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In  addition to the general benefits of EMU  and  the single  currency, the consumer 
must subsequently be provided with information on the scenario for the introduc-
tion of the Euro and must be given satisfactory answers to the specific questions he 
raises. It  is  essentially the task of the Community and  national  authorities and  of 
consumer organizations to gather requests for information  by  the most appropri-
ate means (opinion polls, direct consultations, etc.). 
The questions  most commonly raised  concern the apportionment of the cost of 
moving to the single  currency, price stability, continuity of contracts, the future of 
savings, the conditions governing the exchange of notes and  coins, the dual  display 
of prices and consumer participation in  the decisions governing the arrangements 
for the introduction of the Euro. 
Several frequent concerns can be seen: 
- strengthening consumer confidence with regard to the transparency of transac-
tions in  the single currency; 
- introducing as quickly as possible the dual display of prices and of benefits (pen-
sions, social security benefits, etc.); 
- banks not passing on their adjustment costs to their customers. 
An  appropriate response to these questions calls for: 
- the concentration of communication on the reasons for economic and  mone-
tary union rather than on the means of achieving it; 
- close cooperation between the economic agents concerned (public administra-
tions, banks, enterprises, consumers) as a basis for the formulation of consistent 
replies; 
- flexible information which can be tailored to the country in  question, the target 
population group and  the general economic situation at the time of the Euro's 
introduction; 
- information tailored to the needs of groups with specific difficulties (the elder-
ly, those marginalized by society, the blind); 
- full  and clear information; it is  essential for the consumer to be aware of all  the 
factors  involved  in  the move  to the single  currency so as  to avoid  surprises 
which could lead to rejection of the new currency; 
- education concerning European questions in  general and  economic and  mone-
tary problems in  particular at primary and secondary schools and at university; 
- rapid and clear decisions on the part of the authorities. 
23 In  order to facilitate the transition for particularly vulnerable groups, suggestions 
have been  made for reducing the planned number of coins and notes (seven  types 
of notes and  eight types of coins are being studied). 
The problems of young people received special  attention from the workshop. This 
section  of the  European  population  deserves  particular consideration, since  the 
support of the young is important for ensuring the permanence of the construction 
of Europe. At a time when ideologies are out of favour, the reality of Europe is  still 
an  important beacon and  a demonstration that the future can  be  built and  is  not 
something predetermined. Lastly, young people are receptive to change. 
It must be  borne in  mind that an  information campaign will not be  effective unless 
the  young  are  involved  from  its  inception,  and  that  they  must  themselves  be 
involved in  communication activities. 
The  processing of information 
The Community authorities should make the required information available to the 
Member States which will be engaged  in  the practical organization of the informa-
tion campaigns. The choice of information channels  can  be  determined at national 
level. It is important to establish effective links between consumers and the author-
ities responsible for launching the Euro. Public administrations, but also the banks 
and  enterprises, must provide the consumer with good quality information so as to 
satisfy customer demands. 
At Community level, the competent authorities (Commission, Parliament, Economic 
and Social Committee, etc.) must ensure that information is provided for organiza-
tions operating at that level. 
Given the length of the transitional period before consumers will actually use Euro-
denominated coins and  notes, the information will have to be spread over time so 
as  to ensure that consumers are never inundated with documentation, but rather 
possess the requisite information at the right time. 
As  a priority, efforts must be  made to convince the 'soft' supporters of the move 
to the Euro by stressing the following three procedures: 
- anticipating the underlying trends of accession; 
- avoiding the association of the Euro being considered as  a Europe of the· win" · 
ners; 
- identifying  credible  spokesmen  who  are  not necessarily  politicians  or tech-
nocrats. 
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- Defining, for the use  of consumers, the advantages  of EMU  in  general and  the 
Euro in  particular; clear explanation of the reasons for economic reform. 
- Drawing up an  inventory of the practical problems that consumers will face and 
devising the right answers. 
- Establishing at national level an  appropriate organization to oversee the smooth 
introduction of the Euro and  to pinpoint problems not previously identified. 
- Organizing close cooperation between Community bodies and  national author-
ities, on the one hand, and the representatives of economic agents, in  particular 
consumers, on the other. 
- Establishing a legislative framework. 
- Developing a cultural  and  emotional  dimension  which  consolidates  common 
identity without ignoring the specific  aspirations of citizens  (German pride in 
the DM, etc.). 
- Using cultural channels (music for young people, the decorative arts, etc.). 
- Splitting the campaign  into two segments: 
• an  awareness and explanation campaign, 
• a description of how the move to the single currency will be organized in prac-
tice. 
- Guaranteeing that the Commission retains the initiative in bringing together the 
various actors, so that it has  an  overview and enables the actors to share their 
experiences. There must be frequent opportunities for meetings at which spe-
cific programmes can  be  identified. 
- Paying particular attention to SMEs so that they are provided with a changeover 
framework tailored to their specific problems. 
- Involving women's organizations in  identifying needs and  devising answers. 
If the discussions launched at this Round Table  are to be  successful, the European 
authorities  must be  able  to intensify discussion  within particular sections  of the 
public. The  Commission  has  aroused  expectations. The  means  of satisfying  them 
exist. 
Specific recommendations  regarding the  participation ofyoung people 
- The  Union's  programmes  to encourage  the  mobility of young  people  during 
their  time  in  education  should  be  stepped  up.  Exchange  visits  render  the 
European dimension a tangible and  enriching experience. 
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1996-97 school year they have the material necessary to provide objective and 
appropriate information. While the role of the Member States remains crucial, 
the stimulus  must come from  the Commission so that a coherent message  is 
guaranteed and hence is  credible. 
- The instruments with which young people are familiar must be used: Internet. 
information technology and  interactive programmes. Specific activities could be 
included  in  the programmes prepared by  the Commissioners concerned with 
these issues. 
- The content of programmes must be tailored to specific needs identified in  con-
junction  with  young  people. The need  to test programmes  before  launching 
them seems essential. 
- In addition to the education system, it is  necessary to use the media with which 
young people are familiar. e.g. magazines. etc. Attention was drawn to the poten-
tial  mistrust in  a publicity campaign. 
3.2.2.  Workshop II: Focus on banking. 
financial services and enterprises 
Introduction 
I.  The private sector, and financial  institutions in  particular. will  confront the sin-
gle currency from the first day of monetary union. The challenge  is  immense given 
that the monetary union will  probably involve at least 170 million persons and per-
haps  250 million, an economic area which would be the same size as the USA. The 
challenge  is  also immediate: the entire financial  community (and  many  businesses) 
will work in the Euro from the start on I January 1999. that is  less than three years 
away.  It  is  imperative that the financial  and business community starts preparing in 
earnest and now. 
Public authorities 
2.  If the private sector is to launch extensive and costly preparations, it is  incum-
bent upon public authorities to send and maintain clear signals about their political 
commitment to EMU. The private sector will  scrutinize every action - or lack of 
action - to see whether it should continue to spend large amounts of money on 
preparations. The foreign  exchange and  capital  market will  also be assessing com-
mitment  and  any  faltering  could  easily  promote  a  capital  outflow.  In  the  end. 
monetary union  is  a political event so it seems appropriate that politicians should 
take the lead. 
Their signals  must be backed up with tangible  preparatory actions. Public  authori-
ties at all  levels  must be  involved, from  European institutions right down to local 
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they are respected national  institutions and the public  have faith  in  their ability to 
preserve the value of their currency. So citizens should not view their national cur-
rency as disappearing but rather see it evolving to the European level. 
3.  Messages  - Public  authorities  must launch  - without delay - communica-
tions campaigns for EMU. The key messages must be to explain to citizens the rea-
sons why we are moving to EMU, stressing the many practical advantages for their 
daily lives as well as political motivations.Abstract notions about reinforcing the sin-
gle market are a potent attraction to multinational companies that want to use the 
single currency immediately so as to cut costs. But these concepts are probably not 
so potent to the person in  the street. These communication campaigns  must also 
provide  reassurance  about the  many  concerns which  people  have,  in  particular 
about the ability of the Euro to preserve the purchasing power of long-term invest-
ments and  pensions. The problems of the ageing  population - and their concern 
for savings - was stressed repeatedly. The communication campaign should stress 
that EMU  is  pro-growth, that investment will  rise as a result of lower interest rates 
which, in  turn, should lead to higher growth and employment. Successful  prepara-
tion for EMU  should give  financial  markets confidence in  sustained  price stability 
and lessen the need for any risk premium in  long-term interest rates. 
4.  Actions - Enterprises will  not press ahead with  preparations on the basis  of 
messages alone. Concrete preparations on the part of public  authorities are also 
required. The conclusions of the Madrid  European  Council  were a very  positive 
development, indicating that European leaders at the highest level  are facing  up to 
the EMU  challenges. This framework agreement needs to be  built upon  rapidly  by 
the adoption of detailed decisions on crucial aspects of the changeover. Early agree-
ment and adoption of the Regulation on the status of the single currency is of para-
mount importance in ensuring market credibility. Community authorities must also 
come forward  with  the necessary measures to guarantee the continuity of con-
tracts. Citizens are particularly concerned about the impact on mortgages- often 
their largest single financial  obligation. 
Enterprises would also welcome an  early decision on the technical specifications of 
notes and coins, as  well  a decision on other technical standards of the Euro, such 
as the ISO code. Decisions on technical matters could be undertaken in  advance of 
more politically sensitive decisions, for example the design of Euro notes and coins. 
This would enable enterprises to already start investing in  Euro-compatible equip-
ment and software, thus spreading adjustment costs over a longer time period and 
alleviating potential bottlenecks of key  personnel. 
The establishment of national steering committees to oversee the introduction of 
the Euro would send a powerful message of the commitment of public authorities. 
Similarly,  the tackling  of a  whole  host of technical  aspects  of the  changeover  is 
required, for  example  how to deal  with  rounding  and  the fiscal  aspects  of the 
changeover. Public administrations also need to address the particular concerns of 
SMEs, because they have more limited access to financial  resources and skilled per-
sonnel. So  public authorities both at Community and national  level  need to devel-
op specific  programmes to assist SMEs  with  technical  aspects of the changeover. 
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these companies employ a surprisingly high  percentage of all  private employees. If 
the boss is  confused- and therefore furious- about EMU, then a large number 
of electors will  know about it. 
5.  When communicating decisions on technical matters with the private sector, it 
is  imperative that decisions are adhered to and not subject to chopping and chang-
ing.  Premature communication of non-definitive  decisions, or backtracking, would 
lead to the unnecessary waste of an enterprise's time and resources, and could eas-
ily  generate  a  considerable  negative  backlash  against  the  entire  EMU  project. 
Markets will  be scrutinizing the preparations for EMU and this would be exactly the 
type of muddle that would be seized upon. 
The  role of  enterprises 
6.  Enterprises are ultimately responsible for  preparing themselves for the Euro. 
Recent surveys  indicate that preparations for the introduction of the single  cur-
rency are uneven. In  particular, enterprises outside the banking and financial  sector 
are only  now beginning to examine the wide ranging consequences of the intro-
duction of the Euro, not least the major communication challenges they will  face, 
both internally with  staff and  externally  vis-ihvis  suppliers  and  customers. This  is 
another example  where the capital  markets  may  well  exert a  disciplinary  role. 
Companies are responsible to their shareholders rather than acting as conduits for 
political ideas. None the less, equity analysts  will  scrutinize companies' plans  very 
carefully to see that they are not losing out in  such a major reshuffle of competi-
tive positions.  The share price may well act as a signal, and penalty, if plans are judged 
inadequate. 
7.  To  meet  this  challenge,  banks  and  non-financial  enterprises  must  use  all 
resources at their disposal. Organizations representing industry (e.g. business fed-
erations, chambers of commerce), trade unions and  professional  bodies (accoun-
tants, lawyers)  have  a  crucial  role to play. We heard  several  powerful  comments 
from  trade union  representatives about employee motivation. Given  the common 
nature of the challenge, it is  probably desirable for a whole range of business orga-
nizations to coordinate their activities to avoid  any  duplication  of efforts, benefit 
from  shared experiences, exploit economies of scale  and  ensure that consistent 
information is being distributed to citizens.  The leaders- chairmen and chief exec-
utives - of banks and business should also recognize that they personally have an 
important role in  the entire communications exercise. They must take an  unusually 
high  profile in  explaining to the general public the need for the single currency and 
what their businesses are doing to prepare for it. 
Staff training 
8.  The most pressing communications challenge facing enterprises relating to the 
Euro is to ensure that essential staff are fully informed about its introduction so that 
they are capable of planning and  implementing the necessary technical  measures. 
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line of adapting to the Euro and should therefore be the priority target for in-house 
communication efforts. Other areas of business activity should not be  overlooked, 
in  particular in  enterprises that will switch some of their commercial activities to 
the Euro soon after the start of EMU. The training of personnel will therefore be a 
crucial aspect of the successful adaptation by enterprises to the Euro. This is  espe-
cially the case where staff have contact with the general public because- as  many 
of our participants said -they are the front-line 'ambassadors of the Euro'. 
9.  Staff training could be of assistance to people in their own daily lives. After all, 
employees are individuals who will have concerns of their own about the introduc-
tion of the Euro. Often, they will be wondering if all this makes their job less secure. 
It is  imperative that they are convinced  of the need  for the Euro and  have  confi-
dence  in  the  changeover  process  if they,  in  turn, are  to  be  able  to explain  the 
changeover with conviction to the general public. Staff in  banks and  the retail sec-
tor will have  a key  role in  explaining the single  currency to the general public and 
proper training will make such  people into millions of individual beacons of light in 
these complex issues. 
I 0.  The financial  relationship between staff and  employer will require a dialogue 
that itself should be part of the communication campaign. Clear information will be 
required on the changeover of wages  and  pensions etc. It would be  helpful if con-
version  calculations were clearly indicated on relevant documents, e.g. wage  slips, 
well  in  advance  of the introduction of the single  currency. Enterprises could  also 
consider having  a dual  display  of amounts  both  in  the national  currency and  the 
Euro on relevant staff documents, both before and after the introduction of the sin-
gle currency. 
Relationships with  suppliers and customers 
I I.  Enterprises will face  a major communications challenge of explaining the sin-
gle  currency to their clients and  indeed such  information could play  an  important 
role in facilitating the changeover among the general public.  The retail sector in par-
ticular faces a major challenge. It will take some time for the public to become famil-
iar with thinking in  terms of single currency prices and  many people will inevitably 
harbour suspicions about hidden price increases. A key difficulty arises from the fact 
that a strict application  of conversion  rates  will  inevitably  lead  to  inconvenient 
counter-values in Euro- requiring the rounding of prices. This process could yield 
significant percentage  price changes  for low-value goods. Companies will need  to 
consider how to explain these pricing policies to their customers because they will 
be very sensitive, even  if the total value  is  quite small. 
12.  The communication strategies required to meet this challenge will be  varied. 
Firstly, enterprises will need  to consider how to identify precisely what concerns 
their  customers  have,  and  where  possible,  develop  structures  for  dialogue. We 
heard about the need for 'bottom-up' communication strategies - perhaps  start-
ing with telephone hot-lines. Apparently it does not take long to become very famil-
iar with exactly what the customer does not understand! These  are  the types  of 
29 questions that several roomfuls of economists and professors would never think of. 
A national steering structure could provide a forum for pooling the results, and cre-
ating clear information. Undoubtedly, the best means for overcoming suspicion  is 
the availability of clear information. To  this end, the dual  display  of prices in  many 
cases will  be essential, both before and after the introduction of the single curren-
cy. Regardless of whether the dual display of prices is  obliged by legislation or not, 
companies should consider doing so as a matter of good commercial practice. 
13.  A number of suggestions were made about treating very specific groups of 
consumers. An  example is  the weakest members of society - the old, the blind, 
the poorly educated. Citizens may react against the EMU  process as a whole if busi-
ness  does  not give  special  attention to the needs of the weak. A very  different 
example is  small  cross-border payments. People are likely to think that a single cur-
rency means that all  payments  in  it are as  cheap and quick as their domestic pay-
ments. They could easily feel  cheated if these payments are still  as difficult as  they 
are today or credit card companies levy a surcharge for 'foreign' use even if it is  still 
in  the Euro. 
14.  In  summary, this  communications campaign  is  unprecedented  in  scale. After 
the initial  round of information, we  must all  assess very carefully where our cus-
tomers are still confused and then meet that need. But we must not make our cam-
paign peak too early or everyone will get totally bored with it long before 1999. For 
me, the main  message from  our workshop is  that we  must focus  on the citizen's 
individual needs and not simply explain the benefit to businesses. If we do that, I felt 
very encouraged by the goodwill and commitment to go out and explain. Starting 
with only a few hundred ambassadors, we can achieve a cascade in  those numbers 
in the next few years and successfully introduce the Euro fully- perhaps even ear-
lier than 2002! 
3.2.3.  Workshop Ill: Focus  on public administrations 
I.  Public administrations will  make a decisive contribution to the success of the 
move to the single currency. In  this unprecedented task, they must, as a priority, be 
at the service of the public and of business with a view to creating satisfactory con-
ditions for facilitating their adjustment.  They must prepare themselves for this with-
out delay, at all  levels  - Community, national  and  local  - and  in  a  coordinated 
manner in  all  the countries eligible to participate in economic and monetary union. 
They have  a crucial  role to play  in  providing general and sectoral information for 
the future users of the Euro. Lastly, they have a role to play  in  guiding and facilitat-
ing the use of the Euro. For the credibility of the communication on the move to 
the single currency, it is  very important for public administrations to demonstrate 
unswerving determination  in  honouring their commitments to the attainment of 
economic and monetary union. 
In  view of the magnitude of the task, the most suitable operational level  for a suc-
cessful  introduction of the Euro  clearly  starts at the level  of the Member State, 
which  by  virtue of the subsidiarity  principle, is  the best equipped to deal  with  the 
technical and social questions of concern to its nationals. The local or regional level 
30 is  also very important for the success  of the communication, because  of its near-
ness  to users. At Community level, support must be  provided and  overall  consis-
tency guaranteed. The success  of the changeover  operation hinges  on  finding the 
best synergy  between  the various  levels  of public administration  with  regard  to 
communication. The information process must start right away, the scenario having 
been adopted by the Madrid European Council. 
2.  Public administrations must make meticulous preparations for their changeover 
so  as  to minimize the costs, timetable and  complexity of the operation of changing 
the monetary unit for users  of the single  currency. User information is  crucial to 
the successful  switch to the  Euro.  It depends  on the creation  of the appropriate 
channels of communication such  as: 
- establishment in  each  Member State  concerned of a national steering committee 
bringing together the players concerned by the transition to the single curren-
cy  (public administrations, central  bank, business, consumers, etc.)  and  able  to 
prepare messages which will be  understood by its nationals. This body will have 
to use, as  a priority channel  of information, the professional  bodies  represent-
ing  users  (chambers  of commerce, federations  of SMEs)  which  are  the  most 
appropriate for optimizing the contribution of the private sector; 
- adoption  in  each  administration  of  a  changeover  plan  consistent  with  the 
timetable adopted by the Madrid European Council, and  which will enable the 
Euro to be  used  in  practice in  transactions with the public at the latest when 
the new physical  means  of payment (notes and  coins) are released  for circula-
tion: this plan  will have  to contain a programme of communication tailored to 
the users of these public services and a training programme for the officials con-
cerned; 
- implementation of wide-ranging European cooperation  in the information sector, 
in particular by setting up a specialized group consisting of the Community insti-
tutions  (European  Parliament,  European  Monetary  Institute,  Council, 
Commission) and the Member States concerned: this group could be  backed by 
a team  of independent experts  capable  of assessing  the  effectiveness  of the 
planned communication programme. The role ofthis body will be to ensure the 
consisten~y of the information process and  the optimal allocation of resources. 
3.  Public administrations have a general and  sectoral duty to  inform future users of 
the introduction of the Euro. They must anticipate the needs  of business  and  the 
general  public. This information must reach  users gradually in  line with the imple-
mentation of the scenario: it must be given early enough for their changeover to be 
prepared in  the best possible manner, but without creating confusion. It must, for 
example, deal with the following points: 
- the  information should  cover  the  entire process  of economic and  monetary 
union. It should recall the expected advantages  of the move to the single  cur-
rency  and  should  not  mask  either  the  difficulties  or  the  risks  being  run. 
Transparency must be  the rule in  the communication campaign  with a view to 
ensuring the credibility of the economic and monetary union process and there-
31 fore public acceptance of the Euro. It  is  therefore vital  for user information to 
be complete, objective and practical; 
- the consequences of adopting the name Euro for the single currency; 
- the stability of economic and monetary policies will safeguard the conditions for 
the acceptance of the single currency and the permanence of the commitments 
entered into in the Treaty; 
- the specifications concerning Euro notes and coins will  have to be available quick-
ly, and if possible as soon as the decision is  taken to launch economic and mon-
etary union so as  to make the European currency accessible to users as quick-
ly  as  possible; 
- the changes in  national legislation required by the single currency; 
- the practical campaigns for informing the public. 
These information programmes for the players concerned will  have to be based on 
public and private bodies (producing a multiplier effect) which can facilitate accep-
tance  of the  Euro  (e.g.  chambers  of commerce, business  federations, consumer 
organizations, etc.). They will comprise an educational aspect (e.g. in schools and uni-
versities) and a learning aspect (at the workplace): they will  have to be incorporat-
ed at the earliest possible stage in  the training programmes of future users. 
In  each Member State, the public education services will  have to prepare as  quick-
ly  as possible teaching modules on the introduction of the single currency for the 
school population. The social  ministries and  the benefits agencies  (social security, 
unemployment benefits) will also have to prepare appropriate communication pro-
grammes for the population groups concerned, in  particular the elderly, the poor 
and the handicapped. 
4.  At Community level, the Commission, in  conjunction with the parties concerned 
(Council, Parliament, EM I,  Member States, professional bodies), will  have to prepare 
proposals for legislation (a Council regulation) establishing the legal framework for 
the use of the Euro. Preparatory work for this legislation will  have  to be complet-
ed not later than the end of 1996. These texts will  have to cover: 
- the legally  binding equivalence between the Euro and the. participating national 
monetary units before the introduction of Euro notes and coins; 
- the continuity of contracts denominated in  national currencies or in  ecus; 
- the procedure (timetable) for public authorities to follow in  their transactions 
with  the public  when changing over to the Euro: the switch will  have  to take 
place with the full  introduction of the new physical means of payment at the lat-
est. Community legislation  will  give  the Member States some freedom  in  this 
area. 
32 More generally, the Community institutions should  lose  no time in  tidying up the 
legislative texts in force required for the introduction of the Euro (internal market, 
consumer protection, etc.). 
They should provide ongoing information on the progress of work concerning the 
legal  framework. 
The Community institutions should also develop analyses and arguments which can 
be  used  by the Member States as  part of their communication programmes. 
33 34 4.  Speeches in  chronological order 
4. I.  Mr de  Silguy,  European  Commissioner 
Mr President, Prime Ministers, Ministers, Governors, Members of Parliament, ladies 
and gentlemen, 
It is  a great honour and  also a great pleasure for the European  Commission to be 
able  to welcome you  to Brussels  today for the  launching  of the communication 
campaign for the Euro. I would like to thank the European Parliament very warmly 
for participating in  this event and  for placing this prestigious complex, the  Espace 
Leopold, at our disposal. Without its  help, this  Round Table  conference could  not 
have taken place. 
We could  not wait any  longer before starting to prepare the public for what lies 
ahead;  according to a survey carried out for us  recently, 91%  of Community citi-
zens  are waiting to be  informed about the Euro. We now have the means of doing 
this. 
1995  was a decisive  year  for  the single currency. 
I will do no more than outline briefly the decisions taken by the European Council 
in  Madrid in  December. Agreement was reached on three issues of key importance 
for further work: 
(I) The  name -This was  a long-awaited and  by  no means  a symbolic decision. It 
was necessary to remove the uncertainty which had hung over this question for 
a long time. It has  now been  settled. A  new currency must have  a new name, 
and  the Heads of State or Government decided to call  the European currency 
the 'Euro', in  order to emphasize the intimate relationship between our conti-
nent and  its currency. 
(2) The  scenario -The Heads of State or Government followed the recommenda-
tions made  successively  by the Commission, the European  Monetary Institute 
and  the  Council  of Ministers. The  Euro  will  be  introduced  in  three  phases: 
(a)  the decision to move to the Euro will be taken  as  early as  possible in  1998, 
(b)  the actual  launching of monetary union will take  place  on  I January  1999, 
and  (c)  the complete  changeover of all  monetary transactions  into the  Euro, 
together with the change  of coins and  banknotes, will take place  by the begin-
ning of 2002 at the latest. 
The definitive and irrevocable fixing of parities on  I January  1999 will be accom-
panied by the European Central Bank's conduct of monetary and  exchange-rate 
35 policy  in  Euros  and  the  changeover  to  Euro-denominated  bond  issues  by 
Member States. 
We thus have the necessary basis and credibility to enable economic agents and 
individuals to prepare for the arrival of the Euro. 
(3)  The /ega/. aspects -The  principle of absolute equivalence between the 'Euro and 
national currencies has  been adopted. These will  thus be two different expres-
sions ofthe same economic and monetary reality. The legal  continuity of con-
tracts will  be guaranteed, particularly as regards indiv.iduals  saving and  borrow-
ing. 
These decisions had  to be  taken, but they will  not alone guarantee the complete 
success of the changeover to the Euro.  1996 and  1997 will  again  be  years of hard 
work. 
Our efforts should be focused on three essential areas: 
I.  In  the  first  place,  the  long-term  reinforcement  of convergence.  The  progress 
acheived is  real and must not be underestimated, particularly in  relation to infla-
tion and  interest rates. Nevertheless, public deficits remain too large in  a num-
ber of'Merriber States. Their reduction should be pursued by the putting in place 
of appropriate policies. This effort must not falter throughout the process. With 
or without the Euro, there is  no alternative to restore confidence. There is  no 
other alternative to create the basis  for the healthy  economic growth that is 
necessary :to combat the  present unacceptable  problem  of unemployment in 
Europe. 
2.  In  the second  place, to make  progress  in  the technical  preparations for  the 
changeover. Three structures are being prepared: 
- the :stability pact; 
- theu::elationship between the countries which will  participate at the start of 
monetary union and the others, which  have  the desire to join as quickly as 
p0ssible; 
- lastly; the precise definition of the legal  status of the Euro. 
These works are being undertaken in  parallel. To this end, the Commission will 
produce quickly its proposals, as required by  Madrid. 
3.  Lastly,·to,rol/ back the huge communications deficit This is the reason for our pres-
enc:e ·.t0aay. The introduction of the Euro is  an  operation without precedent in 
the history of our continent. It  must therefore be  the subject of meticulous 
prl:)paration, of which the key words are transparency, clarity and perseverance. 
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Eumpeiis.not imposing the Euro on its citizens. We must convince people of its 
necessity .and  arouse the support of everyone. We must -expose the Euro  to public opinion. For this, it will have to meet the expectations of the general pub-
lic and calm their fears. 
The sounding out of public opinion of which I speak is  also the bearer of hope: 
it demonstrates that in  most countries, favourable opionions on the Euro have 
increased, in  spite of the weakening of economic trends  in  Europe  during the 
last months of the year. Within the European Union, a clear majority of citizens 
remain in  favour of the single  currency: 54%  in  December, compared with 47% 
in  spring. 
However, this  sounding  of public  opm1on  also  revealed  the  size  of the  task 
remaining to be  done. The sceptics and  the  undecided  remain  too numerous. 
They indeed form majorities in  some countries. There are strong fears, particu-
larly concerning the risks  attached to the conversion of currencies. In  several 
Member States, the memory of past monetary reforms is  synonymous with the 
despoiling of savers. We must therefore reassure and, to do this, explain. 
To  be  effective, the explanation process must be  undertaken as  close  as  possi-
. ble-to·the·general-public=cfor example at the bank counter or' in  the school 
- and  this effort must remain constant during the process. It must be  started 
as  soon as  possible. However, at the same  time, account must be  taken of the 
different situations in  the Union: the Member States  must play a central role in 
a really  decentralized  communications  programme. This  could  be  the definite 
message from the Round Table. 
Before I conclude my introductory remarks, permit me to outline the Round Table 
programme briefly. 
This introductory session will continue until 19.30.1n a few moments, the President 
of the Council, Mr Dini, and  the President of the European Monetary Institute, Mr 
Lamfalussy, will speak about the challenges  posed  by  this  conference. There will 
then be an  initial discussion involving all participants. At 20.00 you are all  invited to 
a dinner given  by  the  Commission  President, Jacques  Santer.  At the  dinner, Mr 
Santer, Mr Dehaene, Mr Juncker, Mr Arthuis and  Mr Solbes  Mira will all  speak. 
The workshops will  begin  tomorrow morning at 09.00. You  will find  the detailed 
programme  in  the  documents  sent  to  you.  Presidents  Delors  and  Jenkins  will 
address you at lunch. 
At 18.30, we will have the pleasure of visiting together the very fine exhibition orga-
nized by the Italian Presidency at the Cinquantenaire Museum.  The day will end with 
a concert given by the Mozart Foundation at the Conservatoire Royal, to which you 
are invited by the Commission. 
The Round Table will end on Wednesday morning with a full meeting of all  partici-
pants. Our host, Mr Hansch, the President of the European Parliament, will speak at 
09.00, after which the chairmen of the workshops will summarize the work carried 
out the day  before. Mr Santer will then speak. Finally, we will be  addressed  by the 
members of the sponsoring committee, whom I would particularly like to thank for 
their support. 
37 Permit me, finally, to recommend that you visit the exhibition entitled Time jour-
ney through monetary Europe' which is  being held on  the first floor of this build-
ing. It is  just the sort of exhibition we wished to see: modern, lively and  innovative, 
as befits the communication of information on the Euro.Those of you who have just 
visited it found it entertaining, I believe. 
Thank you  for your attention. Without further ado,  I will  ask  President  Dini to 
address you. 
38 4.2.  Mr  Dini,  President of the  Council 
The European authorities are fully  convinced that the European monetary union is 
the logical  complement to a single  European market. Only with a single  currency, 
the advantages of a single market can be fully  realized. 
The decisions taken by  the European Council in  Madrid constitute a very impor-
tant step towards a single currency. The adoption of a name, the Euro, and the def-
inition  of a  scenario for its  practical  introduction represent a  healthy clarification 
that will  increase our technical capacity to respect the Maastricht Treaty calendar. 
Communication should be effective in  convincing the future user of the Euro of its 
benefits. It  should also create a good psychological climate by  delivering messages 
targeted to the needs of the users. The exhibit on the history of European curren-
cies  here  in  this  building  is  an  excellent instrument to strike the imagination  of 
everyone in  our respective countries. 
The success of the single  currency does not depend only on the fulfilment of the 
economic criteria of convergence. We do know it requires also a widespread pub-
lic  acceptance. The future user of the Euro will  have to be convinced of the intrin-
sic  advantages of the Euro over the national currencies. As  of now, as  it has  just 
been underlined  by  the honourable president of the European Parliament, we are 
facing certain sectors of the European public opinion that hold a rather sceptic, if 
not a  rather negative, view  of the process leading towards a  European currency. 
Our efforts should be concentrated to dismantle the wrong equation that states 
that the  process towards a  single  currency requiring  deficit  reductions  leads  to 
more unemployment and less growth. 
We should instead convince our citizens that the efforts made to improve the state 
of our public finances and the fight against inflation represent an essential structur-
al  factor  to  generate  sustainable,  non-inflationary  growth,  independent  of  the 
Treaty's requirements. 
The European authorities and the Member States have the responsibility to explain 
as  clearly as possible what are the benefits associated with a single currency. 
Allow me to review them briefly. 
First, you all  know that currency related transactions and hedging costs as well as a 
exchange-rate risks within the Union will  be eliminated. This will  lead to cost sav-
ings and provide a stable basis for planning long-term investments. The elimination 
of intra-European exchange-rate fluctuations will  help long-term decision making by 
economic agents, thus facilitating  investments and growth. It  will  also benefit con-
sumers by generating more competition in  the production of goods and services. 
Second, the Euro will  create a liquid financial  market offering a far wider range of 
investment  and  financing  opportunities  than  today's  fragmented  market. 
Competition among financial  centres as well  as among banks and insurance com-
39 panies will  increase, leading to growing benefits for the consumer, and most likely 
to lower interest rates. 
Third, the new single currency will  also play a bigger role in  the international cur-
rency system as a trading, investment and  reserve currency. As  a  result, Europe's 
responsibility and importance for the stability of the system  is  likely  to increase 
comparative to the United States and Japan. 
Fourth, a single  monetary policy  will  also  lead  to price stability  in  each  Member 
State.  The Treaty includes three important conditions in order to achieve the objec-
tive of price stability. First, the strict conversion criteria that ensures that only coun-
tries with a record of stability participate in  the monetary union. Second, the mon-
etary policy of the independent European Central Bank, whose primary obligation 
is to the objective of price stability. Third, the setting up of rules securing budgetary 
discipline  so  that  stability-oriented  monetary  policy  cannot be  undermined  by 
unsound fiscal  policies. 
It  is  often argued, however, that a single monetary policy could be undermined by 
unsound fiscal  policies  in  one or more member countries. The European Central 
Bank could .be faced with the choice of neglecting its goal of price stability, thus vio-
lating.-its  duties,.or--tightening -monetary-policy-which would--affect: -negatively  the 
economies of all  members of the Union. 
The adherence to the Maastricht criteria, the creation of an  independent central 
bank with a clear mandate to fight  inflation, and strict budgetary discipline, should 
enable the new currency to be very stable. 
Rules  to ensure budgetary discipline  therefore will  have a key  role in  producing a 
stable Euro, as indicated in the Maastricht Treaty. We know that a European Central 
Bank  is  prohibited from granting central bank loans to government institutions for 
budget financing. Second, neither the European Union, nor any other Member State 
can  be  liable  for the excessive  deficits  of any  Member State. Finally,  the  budget 
deficit and public debt limits also apply after countries have entered the new union. 
There are also political benefits derived from the single currency. EMU will not only 
serve as a driving force behind further economic integration, but also as  a catalyst 
for political union in  Europe, thus reducing potential intra-European tensions. 
The issue of the relationship between political union and monetary union  is  a sub-
ject of a great deal  of controversy. Some contend that a monetary union is  a per-
manent solidarity union that can only work if there are closer ties on the political 
front. The implications of this view is  that a single monetary policy will  play a deci-
sive role in the economic, fiscal and wage policies of the participating countries, and 
needs to be  supported  by  a  more solid  foundation  of budget discipline, Others 
argue that an independent European central bank and a successful monetary policy 
can  be  better guaranteed  by  sovereign  nation  States  with  interests  that might 
diverge, rather than by a political union with an influential central authority, perhaps 
even better than within a national State with its own central bank. Both sides would 
easily agree that a European monetary union is  very likely to generate momentum 
for political union. 
40 The topic of institutional reform is also important.  The main objective is to stream-
line  the  decision-making  procedures  of  the  European  Union  institutions,  the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament in order to enhance their 
capacity to act also with regard to new members joining. 
A  failure  of the Union would  have  negative  consequences, very negative  conse-
quences. European citizens will have to be made aware very clearly of these as well. 
If the road towards a single currency were to be abandoned, the integration already 
obtained within the European Union could be  jeopardized. 
Monetary cohesion within the EMS  could be  put at risk. Exchange-rate fluctuation 
could increase affecting growth prospects and  unemployment and  distorting com-
petition. Moreover, efforts to achieve  stability and  fiscal  restraint geared  towards 
meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria could be relaxed. All this would in turn 
hamper progress towards completing the single market, as well as progress in other 
key areas of integration such  as  joint foreign, transport and  energy policy. In  short, 
Europe will have suffered a major setback. 
In  this context we should not underestimate the importance of preparing a com-
prehensive  and  effective  plan  to convey  information on  the  single  currency. The 
change towards a single currency and  its full acceptance is  a complex and  sensitive 
operation that will only be brought to success if there is a full understanding of each 
and  every detail and  of the implications for our citizen individually. 
The actual  set-up  of the communicational  effort will be  necessarily decentralized 
and  will require much coordination both on objectives and  contents. The Euro will 
be the single currency of a plurality of States that will give  up their individual mon-
etary and  exchange-rate policies to a common independent central  bank. Hence, 
any message  concerning the adoption of a single currency will have to be coherent 
and well coordinated.  To ensure coherence, all parties concerned- the institutions 
of  the Community (Council, Commission, European Parliament, European Monetary 
Institute), the Member States and  the associations of consumers - should join in 
a serious dialogue with the objective of optimizing communication strategies about 
the single currency. 
We are confident that the work of this Round Table will lead to the emergence of 
a framework within which all parties shall  make useful further progress on the sub-
ject of communication. The Presidency will review very closely the results of these 
constructive efforts and will seek to facilitate an  operational development, in coop-
eration with the institutions involved. 
41 4.3.  Mr Lamfa/uss)0 President 
of  the  European Monetary  Institute 
I welcome the Commission's initiative in  organizing these information and  discus-
sion meetings devoted to the preparation of EMU. 
The Madrid Summit confirmed the political will to implement EMU according to the 
letter and  spirit of the Treaty. By  adopting the principles and  broad guidelines for 
the move to the single currency and  by agreeing on its name, the European Council 
removed uncertainties which were making it difficult for individuals, firms and  the 
public authorities to prepare effectively for the orderly introduction of EMU. 
An important step has just been taken but it is  only one step. There are many chal-
lenges ahead. 
Firstly, there is  the challenge  posed  by the technical and  institutional preparations 
for monetary union and the practical implementation of the plan for moving to the 
single  currency. This  undertaking  has  no  historical  precedent: we  are  sailing  in 
uncharted waters. I am  convinced  that, as  our preparations proceed, we will dis-
cover problems that have hitherto been overlooked or neglected, while other prob-
lems, which seem now to be very acute, will be solved without too much difficulty. 
The preparation of the reference scenario for the changeover to the single curren-
cy  has  already taught us  lessons  in  this  respect. Its  implementation will teach  us 
more. We will not be able to derive benefit from this unless  there is  active coop-
eration between all  interested parties: not only between the Council of Ministers, 
the  Commission  and  the  European  Monetary  Institute but also  between  those 
three institutions and  what - to use  our dreadful  jargon  - we  call  'economic 
agents',  i.e.  consumers, businesses  and  financial  intermediaries. Hence the impor-
tance of continual dialogue- dialogue which the EMI will unreservedly encourage. 
We will also have to face challenges in fields in which 'technical' problems - every-
thing involving monetary union  is  highly technical - are accompanied  by weighty 
political questions. I will mention just three: the choice of the countries considered 
eligible  to  take  part  in  EMU  from  the  outset; the  exchange-rate  relationships 
between those countries and the other member countries of the European Union; 
and finally, the organization of budgetary policy cooperation between the countries 
participating in  EMU. The solutions to these problems are interlinked.  They will dic-
tate the likelihood of success  for both the implementation and  the efficient and 
smooth operation of EMU. They will  have  to be  devised  in  such  a way that they 
underpin the credibility of EMU and  help to promote its acceptance by the public 
in  our countries. In  order to achieve  this twofold objective, they will also  have  to 
be  discussed  with  the  public  at  large  and  in  political  circles,  particularly  with 
Members of Parliament. 
The EMI  will do everything in  its power to ensure that these two groups of prob-
lems can  be solved. It will do so in a constructive and practical spirit, as it did in con-
tributing to the drawing-up of the plan  for the changeover to the single  currency, 
adopted in Madrid. 
42 Permit me to give you some details about our programme of work. 
Turning first of all to the preparation of EMU, the Treaty has entrusted the EMI  with 
the task of specifying the regulatory, organizational and logistical framework neces-
sary for the European System of Central Banks  (ESCB)  to perform its  tasks from 
the beginning of 1999. This framework will  of course have to be submitted by the 
Council of the EMI  for decision to the European  Central Bank at the date of its 
establishment, scheduled for 1998. In  order for the ECB to be able actually to begin 
operating at the beginning of 1999, however, preparatory work has  to be  carried 
out in  1996 and  1997, both by the national central banks and by the EMI. 
This work will  cover all  the fields  in  which a central bank is traditionally active: the 
introduction of monetary policy instruments, the harmonization of statistical data, 
the interlinking of payment systems within the framework of the Target project, the 
preparations for the issue of Euro banknotes and, of course, the operational defin-
ition of the division of labour between the ECB and the national central banks. 
In  order to meet the necessary deadlines, the Council of the EMI  set itself a very 
strict agenda in  the autumn of 1994. Progress in  each of the fields  I have just men-
tioned is  assessed on a quarterly basis, and the agenda is  adjusted to take account 
of new requirements which emerge in  the light of experience. For example, we had 
to speed up work on the plan for the changeover to the single currency, the com-
pletion of which had been programmed for this year. I am  happy to be able to con-
firm that, despite this readjustment, our agenda has so far been met. I am confident 
that this will  continue to be the case in  future regardless of the growing complexi-
ty of the practical and other problems we are bound to encounter. 
What can  be said  about our contribution to the solution of the second group of 
problems? 
The selection  of the countries  qualifying  for  initial  participation  in  EMU  will  be 
decided by  the Heads of State or Government in  1998 as  soon as  reliable figures 
are available for  1997. The EMI  has been made responsible by the Treaty for making 
its  own assessment of the eligibility of each of the countries and for transmitting 
that assessment in  the form of an  opinion to the Heads of State or Government. 
This is  an  advisory function of considerable importance and therefore one of very 
great responsibility. We will  discharge that responsibility in  the knowledge that the 
choice of countries will  play  a decisive part in  the smooth operation of EMU  and 
that no risks can  be taken in  this regard. We still  have two years in  which to deliv-
er that opinion, although the Treaty requires us  to draft an  opinion at the end of 
this year. While this will  not have  any  operational significance, it will  constitute a 
sort of staff exercise and we will  have to weigh every word carefully. 
Permit me to digress briefly on the subject of the potential interaction between the 
recent economic trend and compliance with the convergence criteria in  the bud-
getary sphere- a subject which is  currently assuming increasing importance in the 
public debate. The slowdown in  growth in  the European Union is, notwithstanding 
a few rare exceptions, an incontestable fact. Its duration is, however, uncertain. On 
the one hand, there are none of the signs which traditionally foreshadow a reces-
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heating economy. That is  why  I do not believe there will  be a  recession. On the 
other, we  know that confidence is  still  low among consumers and  has  weakened 
among firms in a number of countries. More time is  required for an analysis of these 
phenomena: we should not forget that slowdowns are frequently observed at the 
end of an  initial  period of expansion. 
In the meantime, I am prepared to risk the following opinion: the impact on the eco-
nomic situation of the budgetary consolidation policies, which are necessary in any 
case  ~rrespective of the Maastricht Treaty, will  depend largely on the way  in  which 
those  policies  are  implemented.  European  citizens  are  just  as  adult  and  well-
informed as  operators on the financial  markets. Experience has  taught them little 
by little to assess the impact of economic-policy decisions over a period extending 
beyond the merely short term. They are therefore aware of the vital need to bring 
excessive  public  spending  in  the social  security, healthcare  and  pension  systems 
fields  under control since they know that the whole of our social protection sys-
tem will  otherwise ultimately be  jeopardized. If  they become convinced that this 
control  of expenditure  is  well  under way,  thanks  to the  introduction  of radical 
reforms, the impact on confidence and the accompanying fall  in  long-term interest 
rates will  compensate for the initial  deflationary effect of the consolidation mea-
sures. By  not attacking the root cause of the problem and offering no permanent 
solution, increased taxation or unusual savings  measures would have little chance of 
achieving this result. 
The EMI  has just embarked on the detailed study of the arrangements which should 
be  put in  place to establish sound exchange-rate relationships between the coun-
tries initially participating in  EMU and the other member countries of the European 
Union. 
At  its  summit  meeting  in  Madrid,  the  European  Council  asked  us  - as  the 
Commission has  also done - to draw up  proposals on this subject. These will  be 
discussed by the Ecofin  Council, and I hope that a consensus can be reached among 
all  interested parties by the end of the year. We are still only beginning to examine 
a problem of very great complexity, both on a technical and professional level  and 
from  a  political and  institutional viewpoint. However, a  number of objectives and 
constraints  are already  fairly  clear. The  exchange-rate  relationships  should  con-
tribute to the smooth operation of the single market- in  which all  the European 
Union countries participate - by preventing in  particular destabilizing fluctuations 
in  real exchange rates. At the same time, they should mark out the route that those 
countries not initially participating in  EMU  should take in  order to be able to par-
ticipate  in  it. The pursuit of stability-oriented policies - the basis of any  credible 
convergence programme- will undoubtedly be the main  instrument for achieving 
these two objectives. Where intervention on the foreign-exchange  market proves 
to be necessary, steps will  have to be taken to ensure that it does not undermine 
the ECB's capacity to carry out its prime task, namely to conduct a monetary pol-
icy  likely to ensure price stability. While the simultaneous achievement of all  these 
objectives does not seem to me to be impossible, it will  be anything but easy. 
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policies within EMU. In  order to be  effective, a single  monetary policy designed to 
promote  price  stability  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  a  coordinated  disciplined 
approach to the conduct of budgetary policies by the Member States  participating 
in  EMU. It would be  unacceptable for the budgetary policy of the Union as a whole 
to be the uncertain result of decisions taken by countries separately and even more 
so  for the sum  of those  decisions  to lead  to a net budget  position  that would 
impose an  excessive burden on monetary policy and damage the economy. The EMI 
will therefore support initiatives taken by governments to guarantee the permanent 
coordinated pursuit of responsible  budgetary policies. As  our guiding  principle  is 
that each  party should assume responsibility for its own area of competence, how-
ever, the  EMI  as  an  institution will  not provide specific  advice  on the manner in 
which this objective is to be achieved. 
45 4.4.  Mr Moystodt, Vice-Prime  Minister 
of the  Kingdom  of Belgium 
Thank you  Mr  Chairman. Very  briefly, it seems to me that the campaign  that you 
have decided to launch and on which you are going to deliberate over the next few 
days  should be implemented  in  such a way  as  to make  the march  towards mon-
etary union appear to be an  irreversible, necessary and comprehensible process. 
Let me first deal with the irreversibility of the process. I consider this to be essen-
tial.  If we want all  players, be they in  the public or private sector (and  I stress in 
passing that much has been made of the consequence which the transition to mon-
etary union will  have, for example, for the banking sector, but I think we should not 
underestimate the changes, indeed upheavals, it will have for the functioning of some 
of our public  administrations), to be fully  committed  in  preparing for  monetary 
union, they must be absolutely convinced that it is  not a waste of time, i.e. that the 
process is  indeed irreversible. And as my colleague Mr Scholbe stressed a few min-
utes ago, I believe that the Madrid European Council was extremely positive in  this 
respect. We must continue on this course. We must avoid any statement from gov-
ernment officials which might give rise to the slightest doubt about the irreversibil-
ity of the process, and the campaign must help strengthen this aspect. 
Secondly,  I believe  that the  campaign  must make  the  process appear necessary. 
Necessary for the people. If we want the largest possible majority of European cit-
izens to support monetary union, they must be convinced that it  is  in  their own 
interest, that it will  help improve their well-being. Monetary union is  not an end in 
itself, but rather we are pursuing it because we are convinced that it is a means of 
better meeting the concerns of the people of Europe. And the campaign must make 
this clear. In  my opinion, Mr Dini's expose gave an excellent summary of the advan-
tages  of monetary union  for the people. If  the campaign  which  you  are going to 
launch could genuinely popularize these themes, I believe that it will  indeed achieve 
its main  objectives. 
Thirdly and finally, I believe that the campaign  must make the process appear com-
prehensible. Despite all  its complexity- and Mr Lamfalussy stressed how complex 
some issues indeed are- despite the technicality of some of the measures we will 
have to take, monetary union must nevertheless remain comprehensible to the man 
in  the street. And it is  therefore very important that we reply in  a practical fashion 
to the questions that some members of the public  are asking themselves on the 
very  practical  and  concrete way  in  which  we will  switch  from  our very familiar 
national  currencies to a European currency, the Euro, questions which are some-
times very down-to-earth and matter-of-fact.! believe that the campaign should not 
hesitate to tackle such questions. I believe, Mr Chairman, that if you go in this direc-
tion, the initiative you are taking today will  be very profitable for us all  in the future. 
Thank you, Mr Chairman. 
46 4.5.  Mr Santer; 
President of  the  European  Commission 
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, 
It gives me great pleasure to welcome you this evening in  the setting of this Round 
Table, with which the Commission wishes to contribute to the successful launch of 
the Euro. 
Alongside the ministers and central bank governors who are here today, I extend a 
special welcome to Prime  Ministers  Dehaene and Juncker. I thank them for their 
support and active participation in  this Round Table. I would also extend a grateful 
welcome to the members of the Committee of Patrons, who have worked so long 
and in  so many different spheres so that Europe may  have a single currency. 
Why are we holding this Round Table today?  Is  it necessary? And  if  it is,  is  it  not 
being held at too early a date, seeing that the Euro will  not be in  circulation until 
2002? 
The transition to the single  currency will  be  a 
historic step, crowning 50 years  of unremitting 
effort in  support of European  integration; inte-
gration which will  become tangible to the point 
of determining the contents of our pockets -
an issue to which each and everyone of us is par-
ticularly  sensitive. Witness the flood  of articles 
on  the  single  currency, the  innumerable  com-
mentaries, and the animated discussions - both 
for  and  against  it.  The  single  currency  is  no 
longer an  academic subject confined to special-
ists- the subject is  on everybody's lips. 
I welcome this  debate - provided  it  is  held  in  Mr j. Santer, President of the European  Commission. 
order to  shed  light  on  the  issues  involved.  It 
must not degenerate into a rearguard battle by those who, on the grounds of a mis-
conceived notion of sovereignty, have  never wanted anything to do with the single 
currency. To them I say:  the road to the single currency has been mapped out once 
and for all. The single currency is  enshrined in  a Treaty which has been ratified. The 
Madrid  European  Council  has  given  it its  name and adopted the scenario for  its 
introduction. 
Pacta  sunt servanda, Treaties must be respected. But it is  better if they are respect-
ed from the heart. This is  why this Round Table  is  so necessary. To  place the single 
currency in  its context.  To  show what is  really at stake in  economic and  monetary 
union. And for this to be done, not by the national and European authorities alone, 
but by  all  of you, the opinion-formers in  our society. Belief cannot be decreed. 
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Let me remind you that the idea of the single currency has  never been in  the tra-
dition of art for art's sake, but is  the logical conclusion of the process of economic 
integration: without a single currency, the advantages of the single market can never 
be fully  realized. 
We must remember the enormous advantages which the Euro will  bring to every-
one (no more exchange-rate and transfer losses), to our national economies (no 
more losses of competitiveness), to the economy of the Union as  a whole and to 
its position in  the world as a competitor and as a financial  centre (the Euro will  be 
a reserve currency which will  shelter us from the vicissitudes of the dollar). 
Let  us  set out the explanations and clarifications  necessary so that everyone can 
look forward to the introduction of the single currency with confidence. With the 
Euro, we will  have  a  single  currency as  sound as  - if  not sounder than - the 
strongest currency in  the Union. How will  this be guaranteed? you may ask. By the 
strict conditions of stability which must be met if a country is to participate in  the 
single currency, by the strong and independent role of the future European Central 
Bank, and by the stability pact which participating countries will  enter into. 
No, it is  not too soon to hold this Round Table. It is  necessary today. The year 2002 
may  seem a  long way off, but the technical operations involved  in  introducing the 
Euro are enormous and the timetable is  in  fact very tight. Let us  not forget either 
that, even  if the Euro will  not be in  our pockets until  2002, it will  actually start to 
circulate between financial  institutions in  1999 and will  be used for public borrow-
ings. Time is short, practical preparations must get under way. 
Am  I too optimistic on the timing? What are we to make of those who quote the 
latest figures for budgets and growth prospects as reason enough for writing off the 
move to the single currency on the date planned? I myself should like to take the 
position of Jean  Monnet, who said  he was neither an  optimist nor a pessimist, but 
a realist hugely determined to attain his  objective. 
This  is  an attitude which the Governments of the Member States will  adopt, I am 
sure. For they have themselves written their objective into the Treaty: the Euro by 
I January  1999. They have demonstrated their determination in  their convergence 
policies. Now that our economies are experiencing a downturn, it  is  essential that 
they redouble their efforts - and, what is  more, they know that there is  no alter-
native and that they must resist the temptation to repeat the errors of the past. The 
Euro  signifies  sound  economic and  budgetary policies.  And  it  is  this  soundness 
which will  be honoured by the financial  markets, by investment and by the creation 
of jobs. 
We will  be helped, as I recently recalled at the European Parliament, by the positive 
fundamentals  of the  European  economy.  Inflation,  public  deficits,  interest  rates, 
exports, profitability, investment - all  these parameters should  inspire confidence 
and sweep away the pessimism discernible in  recent opinion polls. Such optimism is 
not just a fa~ade.lt stems from the objective data that the G7 Ministers have  been 
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upturn in the economic situation. I grant you that the economy is  largely a question 
of psychology. But to be  pessimistic  in  spite  of the positive objective data would 
take us  closer to the realms of psychiatry and  I refuse to believe we have  reached 
that point. 
As  I have  said: beliefs cannot be  decreed. The more that all the players in  econom-
ic  and  social  life  back the crucial  change  represented  by  the introduction of the 
Euro, the more soundly based  beliefs will be. Hence the importance of this Round 
Table  in  itself - but also  as  the starting point for a detailed  and  sustained  infor-
mation  campaign. The  Round Table  underlines  the  importance  of action  by  the 
authorities in  the Member States, with which the prime responsibility lies. It is  up 
to them to ensure that their citizens are prepared in the best possible manner. The 
Commission's  role will  be  that of an  active and  loyal  partner, in  keeping with the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
I thank all  of you who will contribute to this Round Table. Your ideas and your dis-
cussions  will be  the focus  of attention for, and  will be  passed  on  by, hundreds of 
journalists. Your contribution to the  information reaching  the public  is  therefore 
essential. At the  same  time, you  listen  to the  views  of Europeans, you  are  their 
spokesmen. You  will  give  expression  to their  expectations, needs  and  anxieties. 
Hence the extreme importance attached to the information you will give to insti-
tutions and governments to enable them to strike the right note and  to devise the 
best possible forms of action. This historic step- the introduction of the Euro-
can  thus be taken  under the best technical conditions and  with the full  confidence 
of all  those involved. 
I am grateful to you for this. I hope that your work will be fruitful, and  I look for-
ward to seeing you again on Wednesday to evaluate the results of your discussions. 
49 4.6.  Mr Dehoene, 
Prime Minister of  the  Kingdom  of  Belgium 
Those who are critical  of or sceptical about EMU  too easily  forget that it was a 
deliberate  political  choice  which  formed  the  basis  of the Treaty  of Maastricht. 
Without EMU, there would  not have  been a Treaty. The technical  balancing of the 
criteria will  no doubt be very important, but it is  clear that the final  decision will 
ultimately lie  with the European Union's political  leaders. The considerable efforts 
which  practically all  Member States are making to meet the criteria are adequate 
proof that the political will  to see EMU  come to fruition  in  1999 does exist. 
This  is  particularly true in  Belgium, where we hope from  this year to achieve the 
3% target (a reduction by more than half of the budget deficit in  three years, despite 
the sluggishness of the economy) and where we will  have achieved a reduction of 
our national debt of around I  0% between 1993 and  1997. The Belgian Government 
has also developed a long-term strategy which  will  enable the primary balance to 
be  stabilized  at a  high  level  and  a  structural  reduction  of the  debt  rate to  be 
achieved  in  the coming years. 
The main  obstacle to EMU  may  turn out not to be the Maastricht criteria as  such 
but public opinion.  ~n my view, the transition from our national currency to the Euro 
will not pose any major problems in  Belgium. Let us  not forget that Belgium has long 
played  a pioneering role with regard to the ecu. The Belgian  Government is  plan-
ning a consciousness-raising campaign in  order to explain clearly to the population 
the advantages of monetary union. 
An  even greater danger is to use the Treaty of Maastricht and the EMU  criteria as 
justification for a restrictive budgetary policy. Politicians are all  too inclined to say 
that economies are necessary in order to comply with the convergence criteria.  The 
truth of the matter is  that we must in  any case pursue a restrictive budgetary pol-
icy  in  order to reduce our rates of debt and take up the challenge of demographic 
change. It is  therefore not true to say that we are consolidating our public finances 
because of monetary union. The advantages of monetary union are a plus, the cher-
ry on the cake, if  I may so express myself. However, monetary union does impose 
a strict timetable which some in  Belgium would prefer to see eased. 
It is  not always easy to explain the advantages of EMU to the man  in  the street.  The 
image of the traveller moving from country to country within the EU  who, because 
of the commission he has to pay on currency exchange, ends up  with only half of 
his  initial  amount of money left is  not enough. The European citizen must under-
stand that the speculative waves of recent years and the competitive devaluations 
which have taken place have  had a significant influence on his  situation, his  income 
and his job security. Only EMU  can rid us of this handicap and the negative influence 
it has on confidence. 
EMU  will  also allow Europe to protect itself better against monetary shocks else-
where in  the world (given that dollar fluctuations have only limited influence on the 
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linked to the fact that it is  called  on to play a role for which Germany's economic 
base  is too small. Only a European economy and  a European currency will be able 
to play this role. 
Moreover, without EMU it will only be  a few years  before we see  a total disinte-
gration of the  single  market, and  the appeal  of protectionism would  not remain 
unanswered for very long. If EMU  does  not see the light of day, it would not only 
be  a grand  project of economic integration that would fail  but also, I believe, the 
very essence of European integration would be  lost. 
It is obvious that EMU  must become a reality. Current policy is too geared towards 
nominal convergence, which is  in  itself good, but we cannot lose  sight of the real 
thing. Monetary union  is  not a goal  in  itself but rather a means of increasing pros-
perity and  employment, something which is  not always adequately stressed. 
All this presupposes closer collaboration between the Member States in  determin-
ing economic policy; thus, for example, the time has come for the 'hard-core' coun-
tries to improve how they monitor among themselves the overall economic situa-
tion and then to be able to adapt their interest-rate policy more accurately to that 
situation. Nobody has anything to gain from monetary 'overkill'. We sometimes have 
the impression that some authorities are still engaged  in  past battles. In  the  1970s 
and  early  1980s, our economies suffered from a high  rate of inflation. Today, most 
EU countries have significantly curbed inflation or, better still, reduced it to zero. At 
a given time, a policy of competitive disinflation is  every bit as  disastrous as  a poli-
cy of competitive devaluation. 
An ephemeral monetary or budgetary injection is  not, however, the key to success 
in combating the scourge of (long-term) unemployment.  The EMU scenario must be 
linked to structural policy, and  an  effective fight against unemployment is  only pos-
sible on two conditions: a stable  macroeconomic environment, which EMU  should 
guarantee us, and  a structural reform of the labour market involving greater flexi-
bility on  the part of businesses  and  employees  alike. The  latter is,  moreover, the 
objective of the White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment and the 
multiannual employment plan adopted at the Essen Summit. The first annual assess-
ment in  Madrid revealed that we are on the right track, although progress is  slow. 
European  integration does  not only mean  the single  market and  monetary union; 
bolstering the social dimension and  giving priority to employment are every bit as 
vital. It will not be  enough to run a clever TV advertising campaign to convince the 
average  European of the benefits of monetary union. We must also achieve tangible 
successes. A  European Union without adequate integration at the social, ecological 
and  tax level would lose a crucial dimension. We will have to devote the necessary 
attention to this aspect at the IGC. 
But all of this will be possible only if we achieve genuine monetary union since only 
that will guarantee the irreversibility of the European integration process. If we fail, 
I fear that we will provoke an  equally irreversible process of disintegration. 
51 4.7.  Mr Barnier; 
Delegate Minister 
for  European Affairs, France 
Your  Royal  Highness, Prime Ministers, Madam, Mr  President, ladies and gentlemen, 
dear friends: as you can  see from your menus, Jean Arthuis, the French Minister for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, was to have spoken to you this evening, but he had 
to return to Paris earlier than planned. I trust you will  forgive  him.  In  the hope of 
not disappointing you unduly, I will  endeavour not to stray too far from the talk he 
has  asked me to deliver in  his  place, that is to say, to remain as faithful  as  possible, 
but all  the same not too faithful  to it. 
As Mr Santer said just now, what is certain is that in  Madrid, with the Heads of State 
or Government acting as the driving force, an  important step was taken which will 
be decisive for Europe. Once again, the pooling of essential economic and financial 
interests, in  this instance the currency, is  a clear sign  of the will  of the peoples of 
Europe to share a common future. But make no mistake. The single currency is  not 
a small  matter. On  I January  1999, Europe will  embark on a new stage of its histo-
ry and each Member State making the transition to Stage Ill  on that date, as well as 
every citizen, will, by  I July 2002 at the latest, be able to see the practical effects of 
this decision  in  everyday life. 
And ladies and gentlemen, as  is only natural in  a matter as serious and as important 
as  this, a host of questions are being asked and discussions taking place in  each of 
our countries. Are we to believe that our fellow citizens are now fully informed and 
reassured? As for the economic operators in  each of our countries, have they fully 
taken on board the scale and  nature of the changes they will  have to make before 
this date, which is now very close? What about our administrations - do they real-
ize the size of the task awaiting them over the same period? 
To  be utterly frank and to avoid  lapsing into political  platitudes, I have to say no to 
these three questions, and  probably  to some others as  well.  Hence the burning 
necessity facing  us to communicate in  order to inform, but also in  order to under-
stand and to adapt as best we can with regard to the innumerable practical arrange-
ments we still  have to make before Stage  Ill  actually starts. 
Here is  also the reason why,  Mr  Santer and Mr  de Silguy, the French Government 
welcomes with thanks the initiative you have taken. 
It  is  precisely because there is  a debate, because there are doubts, because there 
are criticisms, because there is  controversy surrounding the single  currency, the 
convergence criteria and  their relevance that those who have  wanted this curren-
cy, and we count ourselves among them, that those who have created it, that those 
who are responsible for making  it a reality, must today come out of their offices, 
make  their views  known, communicate, go  out into  the field  and  convince. We 
therefore have to explain and convince, and if I may state my conviction, today and 
every day demonstrate time and time again the need for European monetary union 
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to provide our citizens, in  particular the young, quite simply with renewed justifica-
tion for Europe by  constantly referring to the issues which give  cause for concern 
and generate interest among the public. These are, of course, employment, the fight 
against unemployment, but also personal safety, the protection of human rights, and 
the environment. We therefore have to explain and convince. 
The practical arrangements for the transition to the single currency are the result 
of negotiations among  I  5 partners, but the details have, to say the least, not always 
been brought to the notice of our fellow citizens. We therefore have to disseminate 
this--information widely so that everyone can  understand exactly what is· going to 
happen and how it will  happen and so that they can appreciate the implications for 
their own affairs or their own everyday life. 
This process of explanation is  an  onerous and quite inescapable burden for each of 
the players - the Member States, the Commission, the central banks and  all  the 
intermediate bodies concerned. It is  necessary, ladies and gentlemen, to explain but 
also to convince, since the change - and it is a great change for the day-to-day life 
of all  Europeans - reawakens fears because it will affect each and every one of us 
at the core of our daily lives. The transition to the single currency can leave no one 
indifferent. 
Yet I feel that, in the mind of our compatriots, the single currency is today too close-
ly  associated with  the mere observance, and  nothing  but the observance, of the 
convergence criteria. Of course, it is  absolutely necessary to meet the criteria. It  is 
up to the governments to explain the whys and wherefores of the matter. It  is  up 
to our governments to demonstrate in  what way this currency is  one of the ingre-
dients,  perhaps  the  main  ingredient,  in  the  economic  security  to  which  every 
European aspires. 
But I also feel, as you said just now, Mr  Prime Minister, that we have  to widen our 
outlook and to do so quickly. To  demonstrate the positive spin-offs of the move to 
the Euro, to make this shared ambition attractive and therefore desirable. In  short, 
we must place this  instrument, the single currency, in  a political  context. If we are 
to describe today's Europe in  strictly accounting, technical or mechanical terms, we 
can  surely expect failure. This is  the justification, this  is  the anxiety, the preoccupa-
tion  or rather the  requirement, that explains  a  number of the contributions we 
heard at the last  European  Council  in  Madrid, at the very moment when the  I  5 
Heads  of State  or Government were  unanimously  taking  historic  decisions  to 
launch the single currency definitively. This is the justification for several of them -
I am  thinking  in  particular of President Chirac - insisting that its  first and  true 
dimension be restored to the European Union: a human dimension which places the 
individual firmly at the heart of our political  project. 
We not only have to explain and convince, we have to prepare. The changeover to 
Stage  Ill  will take place in  less than three years. At that date, the wholesale markets 
and the operators who trade on them will  be those most directly concerned, and 
in  under six  years, Euro-denominated notes and  coins will  be in  circulation. With 
the anxieties prevailing today, on employment and other matters, these dates may 
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started for all those involved. 
This is why, once again, we think that this Round Table organized by the Commission 
both sends a signal and fulfils a need. Let us therefore, in  each of our countries, but 
also  here  in  Brussels, at  Community level, set in  motion a genuinely  interactive 
process in which everyone can  be  informed of the decisions that will be taken and 
which will identify the problems to be dealt with. It is in this way that pragmatic and 
consensual solutions discussed with professionals will be arrived at. 
What I have just said  is  not only the business of governments, it is  the business  of 
everyone. In any case, and  I shall  say no more in this connection, which has been an 
introduction and a symbol of our determination to press ahead, I should simply like 
to tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is with this sense of purpose, a sense of pur-
pose which has  been  shared by all the leaders of my country for quite a long time 
now - I  am  thinking  of President  Giscard  d'Estaing's  commitment  and  more 
recently, for the last  14  years,  Franc;:ois  Mitterrand's unflagging  determination on 
these matters concerned with the construction of Europe- that France, confident 
and  resolute vis-cJ-Vis  its European future, is  planning its preparations for the single 
currency.  Like  other governments, the  French  public  authorities  will  be  making 
arrangements in the next few weeks both in the fields of communication and train-
ing and with a view to preparing all  the public administrations. It is  therefore, once 
again, with very keen  interest that we will welcome the conclusions of this Round 
Table and will take them to heart and  make the best use of them on the ground, as 
close as possible to the citizens whose questions today assail us, especially as -and 
I am  quite convinced of this - they have  such  high  expectations of the next stage 
in  the construction of Europe, which will usher in  the single currency. 
54 4.8.  Mr Solbes  Mira, 
Minister  for  Economic Affairs and  Finance 
of the  Kingdom  of Spain 
Introduction 
There can  be  no doubt that, with the signature and  ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty,  the  European  integration  process  made  a  qualitative  leap  that  can  be 
described  as  historic. The  binding  legal  force  given  to a  set  of objectives  - of 
achieving economic convergence in  Europe, of putting the finishing touches to the 
single  market, of placing  strict limits on  budget deficits and  of ensuring the inde-
pendence of the single monetary authority- as  key conditions for introduction of 
the single currency marks the beginning of a new era in our economic and  political 
relations. 
When  it decided  on  the  scenario  for  the  changeover  to the  Euro,  the  Madrid 
European  Council  mapped  out the necessary  steps  and  decisions for introducing 
the single currency as from I January  1999.There are therefore only three years to 
go before the third stage of economic and  monetary union is  due to begin and we 
face a timetable crammed with exciting, albeit sometimes daunting, challenges. One 
- and  by  no means  the least- of these challenges  is  to raise  the level of public 
awareness  and  public  acceptance  of the currency which, at a date  that is  getting 
closer all  the time, people will begin  using in  their daily lives. 
In  my view, introduction of the Euro is  linked by public opinion to three key topics 
which should be the focus of any  information campaign: 
(I) the requirements  laid  down in  the Treaty for joining economic and  monetary 
union; 
(2) the benefits of switching to the Euro; 
(3) the time scale in which each country aims to be ready for joining the single cur-
rency. 
I would like to look at the first two questions in  general terms and  then go  on to 
tackle the third one from the standpoint of my own country, Spain. 
The convergence criteria 
In  laying down the criteria for participation in  economic and  monetary union, the 
Treaty does nothing more than formally adopt some principles of economic policy 
which have been shown both in theory and in  practice to be the appropriate means 
of achieving the highest rates of sustainable long-term growth. 
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logical  spectrum, who sometimes question whether these principles are the right 
ones for tackling the main problem facing our economies at the present time: unem-
ployment. 
I am  convinced  that one of the  major  tasks  awaiting  us  in  the communication 
process we are about to embark upon will  be to break the link that some people 
have  been  misled  into  believing  exists  between  nominal  convergence and  unem-
ployment. We must offer our citizens a positive message and convey to them our 
steadfast belief in  the need to persevere with macroeconomic stabilization policies 
- legitimate policies that protect the weakest members of society against inflation 
and safeguard the prospects of future generations.  We must also convince them that 
the only way of maintaining prosperity in  our societies is  to enable our markets to 
shake off their rigidities and adjust to situations brought about by the globalization 
of the economy, and that we must therefore not flinch  from the necessary struc-
tural reforms. 
The advantages of the Euro 
The second  major objective  of the communication  effort, on which  not enough 
emphasis has been placed so far, is to bring home to economic operators and mem-
bers of the public the inherent advantages of the single currency, quite apart from 
the benefits which  the economic policies  necessary for  introducing  it will  bring. 
These advantages are beyond doubt: 
- transaction costs will  fall  and there will  no  longer be any  need to hedge intra-
Community transactions; 
- intra-Community  investment  will  be  facilitated  by  the  disappearance  of 
exchange-rate uncertainties and foreign  investment will  flow  into a wider and 
wider market, with a common price language; 
- on the international currency markets, emergence of the Euro will  undoubted-
ly  make  for greater stability  since  it  will  become the official  currency of the 
world's biggest trading partner, the European Union. The current narrowness of 
trading in  the German mark against the dollar will  disappear, and so the periods 
of turbulence in  the dollar area will  not produce as  much volatility in  the mar-
ket for the German mark and the other European currencies as they do at pre-
sent; 
- the Euro can be expected to take a much higher profile on the foreign-exchange 
markets than any of the national currencies today and to loom large in  interna-
tional currency reserves. Its share of international portfolios will  be larger than 
that of the present national currencies put together; 
- lastly, there is  no doubt that the creation of a money market in  Euros will boost 
foreign  investment and  enable the  Euro-denominated  public  debt markets to 
compete effectively with the market in  US Treasury bills  and bonds. 
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any fears that the public might have about the changeover. We will  have to demon-
strate to the people of those Member States which have a longer tradition of sta-
bility that the Euro will  be at least as stable as the most stable existing currency and 
that they stand to lose nothing through the replacement of their national curren-
cies. 
We should also explain that the costs of introducing the Euro will  be limited in time 
and  in  extent and that, once the adjustment process  has  been mapped out, busi-
nesses and consumers can  minimize those costs by  incorporating a further factor 
- introduction of the Euro- into their investment plans. 
The advantages of the single  currency will  undoubtedly depend on a critical  mass 
of countries being able to join the monetary union from the start and all  the other 
countries that so wish being able to participate at a later stage, in an open and non-
exclusive process that supports the efforts towards convergence made by  Member 
States. 
Spain will take part in  EMU in  1999 
This leads me on to the last part of my talk; allow me to say a few words now about 
the possible timetable for Spain  joining the single currency. 
Spain  has given  its  unequivocal  backing to the EMU  project. Fulfilment of our con-
vergence programme puts us on course for taking part in  monetary union from the 
beginning of the third stage. In  line with this priority, the Spanish  Government has, 
despite  the  ups  and  downs  of political  life,  taken  all  the  necessary  measures  to 
ensure that we are not deflected from our objectives in  1996. 
The fact remains, however, that, like  many other Member States, Spain  is  at a turn-
ing  point, both politically and economically. On the political front, we have to bear 
in  mind that any slackening of our budgetary consolidation efforts could cast doubt 
on our ability to take part in  EMU  in  1999. According to the Commission's most 
recent estimates, Spain's  budget deficit will  be equivalent to 3.6% of GDP in  1997; 
this  means  that, whatever the Government that· emerges from  the forthcoming 
elections, it  will  have  to continue earnestly with  the necessary efforts  if  it  is  to 
achieve the objective of bringing the deficit down to 3% of GDP in  1997. 
As far  as  economic factors are concerned, it has to be acknowledged that the cur-
rent slowdown or pause in economic growth in  Europe can make the process more 
uncertain. But we are convinced that the slowdown in  Europe is a temporary pause 
and  is  basically  the result of transitional  factors. We believe  that, against a  back-
ground of budgetary consolidation, the recent trend in  monetary policy, the exis-
tence of savings  in  the households sector and the level of company profits bear out 
our optimistic growth forecasts for 1996 and  1997.There is  no doubt, however, that 
we need to restore public confidence in the future and particularly in  the beneficial 
effects  of the  structural  reforms  needed  to  boost the  competitiveness  of our 
economies and place our finances on a sound medium- and long-term footing. 
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and  now taking the necessary steps to ensure that, between  1999  and  2002, the 
Euro is  introduced as easily and as smoothly as possible and that the costs undoubt-
edly involved in the process are seen as a necessary investment in  a growing econ-
omy. 
58 4.9.  Mr Juncker;  Prime Minister 
of the Grand  Duchy of Luxembourg 
Your Royal  Highness, Mr Prime Minister, Mr President of the Commission, ladies and 
gentlemen. 
When I learnt that my  speech would be given  during a dinner, I was impressed at 
the Commission's genius for organization. But when I then learnt that my  speech 
would come not between the cheese and the dessert but between the dessert and 
the coffee, I felt that I would be wise to bring it forward by a few minutes. And when 
you are the last speaker on the agenda, you are faced with the fact that the speech 
which your excellent colleagues have  prepared for you  is  not worth very much any 
more. I would therefore permit myself, Your Royal  Highness, ladies and gentlemen, 
to make a few very quick remarks. 
Barely  five  weeks ago,  the  Heads  of Government of the  Fifteen  decided  at the 
Madrid Summit on the name 'Euro' for the single currency and  agreed on the ref-
erence scenario for the transition from the second to the third stage of economic 
and  monetary union.  In  taking  this  dual  decision, Europe's  leaders  showed their 
steadfast desire to adhere to the commitment enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht, 
which firmly and  solemnly lays  down the date of I January  1999 for the transition 
to a single currency. 
It  is  surprising, indeed almost deplorable if we were not a democracy, to see that 
even after the Madrid Summit, which was supposed to put an end to all doubt, there 
is still  uncertainty about the European Union's ability to achieve its monetary objec-
tive by  the target date. 
There are two types of talk which feed doubt.  The first questions the very philoso-
phy  and  economics behind  economic and  monetary union, while  the second fo-
cuses on its technical and political feasibility. Both have in  common the fact that they 
conclude, disastrously in  my view, that the target date of I January  1999 should be 
abandoned and that Europe's monetary ambitions be postponed. 
Even  before the Madrid  Summit, the opinion was voiced, and  it continues to be 
voiced, that the philosophy and economics behind the Maastricht Treaty will  lead to 
a breakdown of solidarity and to internal collusion within Europe, to a kind of frac-
ture or demarcation line between two camps, i.e. the insiders and the outsiders.  This 
would stem from the fact that some countries will,  by  1999, have  met the condi-
tions for entry into economic and monetary union and thus take part in  it from the 
outset, while others, having failed  to comply with the convergence criteria, will  be 
excluded from it. This situation would create a split, a fracture, a demarcation line, 
an  irreparable 'two-speed' Europe. 
I must say that I am quite surprised by this argument, which is  in  any case unfound-
ed. Is  there at present a rupture within  Europe because there is  a group of coun-
59 tries which are more closely bound with each other in  monetary terms than with 
others? Is  it really possible to think that introducing the idea of economic stability 
into the Treaty will  in  future split Europe into two camps. I do not think so. When 
the Maastricht Treaty was being drafted and when, both before and after Maastricht, 
we pointed the way towards monetary union, we all  agreed on the need to intro-
duce this aspect of stability, which is also the basis from which Europe's future mon-
etary cohesion will  emerge. I do not understand why some people are now sur-
prised to discover the exact content of the Treaty. I suspect them of not having paid 
enough  attention to its  provisions  when  it  was  being  negotiated, drawn  up,  pre-
pared, debated, ratified by national parliaments and signed by the governments who 
were - and  I stress - responsible for it. There is  thus no need to pretend to be 
surprised today to discover that there is an aspect of stability which, tomorrow and 
for only a moment in  our common history, will  divide  Europeans between them-
selves. 
There  is  a  second  type  of talk  which  gives  rise  to doubt, i.e.  claiming  that the 
Member States of the European Union will  be unable to meet the convergence cri-
teria. I am able to say here, and do not suspect me of making a partisan speech, that 
Luxembourg is the only country to meet the Maastricht criteria-at present.  To  con~ 
sole those which do not yet do so, I may  tell you that it brings you nothing at the 
level  of domestic politics. But I must also say that the fact that Luxembourg meets 
the convergence criteria after a period of I  0 years during which I have been respon-
sible  for the country's finances  clearly  shows  that they  are not as  severe as  is 
claimed. 
The idea that the necessary strengthening of employment policies - and  this  is 
more than essential - will  lead the Member States of the Union to eat into their 
budgetary  margin  of manoeuvre  in  such  a  way  as  to increase  their  borrowing 
requirements in order to be able to implement a proactive labour-market policy is, 
in  my opinion, based on a false  reasoning. It is a reasoning which I strongly challenge. 
Does one really believe that borrowing and debt are the only weapons available to 
governments to combat under-employment? Can it really be the case that a budget 
deficit  is  the only imaginable means at our disposal of fighting  unemployment?  If a 
high level of debt were to go hand in hand with an active employment policy, Europe 
should  not be faced  with  an  unemployment problem since  debt throughout the 
Union is  already high  enough. 
I therefore believe, ladies  and  gentlemen, that we must put an  end to this  doubt, 
which  I dare not describe as  collective  since  I do not think that the peoples of 
Europe are prone to flying  permanently in  the face of good sense. I believe that we 
have  to explain to our citizens the benefits of monetary union and  that we must 
put a stop to this harmful propaganda which emphasizes the damaging effects which 
it is  claimed monetary union would have. There is  no contradiction between social 
policy and a well-contained monetary policy. There is  no contradiction between a 
policy  of budgetary consolidation  and  a  proactive  employment policy.  I think we 
must contrast this renunciation of Europe, this fatalism, with the benefits which the 
European idea has for consumers, travellers and something as vital to Europe as its 
small and medium-sized enterprises and exporting industries and  realize that mon-
etary  union  will  reassure  enterprises  as  to  their  future  and  make  them  more_ 
inclined to invest not outside but within Europe. 
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a little ardour, which is necessary for all  big ambitions and  long journeys. Monetary 
integration must, in  my opinion, be  placed  within the context of a wider array of 
ambitions which go beyond monetary policy. Let us not forget, as we all  have a ten-
dency to do, particularly the youngest of us, that the dramatic question which our 
continent had to answer, and  often wrongly, over the course of past centuries and 
indeed the present one was the question of war or peace. I consider that monetary 
union, given  that it forms part of wider ambitions, is  a work of peace  since  it will 
tomorrow be  the basis of our community and  union. We must therefore patiently 
look at the facts and  not waver as  much as  the economy does. Thank you for your 
attention. 
61 62 4.1 0.  Mr Oreja, 
European  Commissioner 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
It is with great pleasure that I am able to speak to you today at this workshop ded-
icated to the role of public authorities in the transition to the single currency. 
The Commission's initiative in  organizing today's  Round Table  results directly from 
the conclusions and recommendations set out in its Green Paper on the single cur-
rency.  As  you  will  be  aware, the general  guidelines  relating  to a communication 
strategy are defined in that document.  The deliberations at this Round Table are the 
planned, logical  and  concrete  follow-up to the  ideas  first  mooted  in  that Green 
Paper. They will contribute to the formulation of strategy and, in  particular, to the 
definition  and  allocation  of  roles  for  the  dissemination  of  information.  The 
Commission will place at the service of this strategy its experience of communica-
tion campaigns conducted at European level in partnership with the Member States, 
operators, intermediaries and  networks. 
The approach  proposed  by  the Commission for the transition to the  single  cur-
rency is  highly innovative. Our meeting today is  a very good example of this new 
approach, which is  based on the Commission's strong desire to place the citizen at 
the centre of its concerns, to listen to what he  has to say and to meet all his infor-
mation needs and  expectations. 
Experience has  shown us  the perverse effects which result when citizens are not 
allowed to be involved or to take part in the major debates of substance. We all still 
remember the problems encountered with public opinion in the referendums orga-
nized on the Maastricht Treaty.  · 
As  the  Commission  Member  responsible  for  information  and  communication, I 
would place emphasis on the pivotal role the public at large has to play in  ensuring 
the success  of the transition to the Euro and  on the need to inform it about the 
process as  quickly as  possible and  under the best possible conditions. 
In  this connection, our action must be  all-embracing and  achieve  an  effective level 
of information for all  citizens without distinction. This objective must guide  us  in 
working towards the success of this great European venture. 
My concern today is  therefore to examine with you how this all-embracing action 
should be organized, how responsibilities can  be  shared out and assumed in a com-
plementary fashion, and  how the  work of each  individual  or body  can  involve a 
transfer between all  participants, thereby creating the necessary synergy. 
I wish to draw your attention to two matters which I consider to be of fundamen-
tal  importance. 
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contribute to a better organization of the information and communication activities 
of European, national and  local authorities in the area of the single currency. 
Then I will go on to present my ideas on the Commission's pivotal role in the field 
of information. 
Three principles to guide public authorities 
in disseminating information on the single currency 
I.  The first principle is  that the public must be given the information it needs con-
cerning the practical consequences of the successive stages  leading to EMU. In 
other words, information must be provided as and when the transition scenario 
moves forward. 
In the immediate future, priority should be given to the operators in the public 
and private sectors responsible for devising and setting in place the mechanisms 
specific to each stage. Communication with users of the Euro will be stepped up 
as the timetable for the implementation of change in everyday life advances. This 
approach must continue to guide all those involved in communication and  infor-
mation activities in order to ensure coherence and  interaction between all  the 
communication measures taken. This principle of progressiveness also exists in 
the symbolism of the standard logo which is  familiar to you and  with which we 
will have to live in the years ahead. 
2.  The second principle is that of the application of subsidiarity in the field of com-
munication. 
According to this principle, wherever the national, regional or local authorities 
are best able to take on the task of informing the citizen, they should have  sole 
responsibility for so  doing. 
The  European  institutions will  intervene  in  all  cases  where they can  provide 
added  value  to the programme of communication, in  particular by  replying to 
requests for information and assistance from the Member States. 
The principle of subsidiarity, the pivot of future communication policy, is  indis-
tinguishable in  practice from the principle of proximity, which is  the third prin-
ciple to which I wish to draw attention. 
3.  The need for proximity in  such  a sensitive field as  that of the currency is  self-
evident. 
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Generally speaking, it is  above all  the national and  local  authorities which will 
clearly have  the initial, immediate and  decisive contact with the future users of 
the Euro. The success and acceptance of the transition to a single currency will 
largely depend on the quality and  readability of the information they provide. The existence of different cultures, traditions, types of behaviour and degrees of 
sensitivity means that the message .and  the style will have to'be adapted to the 
different segments of public opinion. 
Application of the principle of proximity means  being heard and  understood by 
all  citizens  in  their daily  life, at a  level,.i:hat  is  as  close  to them  as  possible. 
Proximity and  decentralization go hand· in. hand  in  the area of.'communication. 
In  the event, the principle of proximity must be  reflected in-a decentralization 
of tasks  between the various tiers of public administration. Our message  must 
be  tailored to the characteristics of each  national, regional or local community. 
Decentralization of communication with the public will be an .effective means of 
gearing the message to the consumer. 
But the supply of general  information on the transition to. the single  currenc'y. 
and  the  coordination  of the  progression  from  one  stage· to the  next  is  the 
responsibility of the  European  institutions. Communication that concerns  the 
implementation at national  level  of mechanisms for the transition to the  Euro 
and  is  directed at public and  private operators and  at the public  is  the respon-: 
sibility of the public authorities. 
The role of the Commission departments is  essentially to· encourage and  assJst 
communication  in  the  Member States  and  to achieve  coordination  between 
those national campaigns and  its own. I shall  now turn to the specific  contribiJ~ 
tion the Commission can  make to such  joint action. 
Position of  the Commission as originator of information on the Euro 
!  :' 
Part of the Commission's contribution is  lin.ked to its role as  the source and  orig(- .  .  . 
nator of information on the single currency. 
The Commission has decided to give greater priority to bringing the people closer 
to Europe. This  obligation of transparency and  information also  applies,  as  it has. 
done to each  and  every stage  of European  integration, to the changeover to the 
Euro, especially since public opinion does not distinguish between the Euro and  an~ 
other facet of the European  venture. If public opinion is  won over as  regards  th~ 
Euro,  the  entire  position  of  the  European  Union  will  be  strengthened. The 
Commission, as  the originator of information on  the  Euro,  is  able  to provide  a 
unique response which may serve as  a legal framework. It therefore has the difficult · 
job of setting the tone of the information diss~minated on the Euro. 
Thus, the Commission's task  vis-c'J-Vis  the media in  general  is  to satisfy requests or 
needs for information on the transition scenario by  providing an  overall response 
such  as  cannot be  supplied at national level. 
Another task will be to come up with a  series of messages which can  be  relayed at 
national  and  sectoral  level  while  retaining  their  uniformity  and  coherence. The 
Commission therefore intends in the near future to make a whole panoply of struc-
65 tured information available to Member States and operators which they will be able 
to use at national level in their communication campaigns conducted in conjunction 
with the European institutions.  The offices and  representations of the institutions in 
the Member States will have an  important role to play in  relaying this information. 
The Commission will also provide support by  keeping everyone informed of each 
other's plans with regard to communication in order to facilitate exchanges and fos-
ter complementarity. 
To this end, the Commission will now concentrate on: 
(a)  developing a database accessible on the Internet via the Europa server; this data-
base  will provide easy access to all the information concerning the Euro, includ-
ing its legal  and  statutory aspects  and  the scenario for its introduction, and  in 
particular will allow information to be  selected  by category or type according 
to the target audience; 
(b) creating and constantly updating an  information base  covering all the communi-
cation  measures  planned  by  the Member States  and  their administrations, by 
economic and  financial  operators, and  by organizations representing society at 
large; the aim  of this  base  will be  to provide mutual  information, to create  a 
forum for the exchange  of ideas  and  to encourage synergistic and  interactive 
campaigns; in so doing, the Commission will provide the impetus and  coordina-
tion which cannot be  provided at any other level. 
In  conclusion, I should like to remind you of the questions which all  those who, in 
one way or another, are directly or indirectly involved in informing the public of the 
transition to the Euro will have to bear in mind. 
These are: 
- how should the various stages of the transition to the Euro be  organized while 
taking account of the legitimate concerns of the public? 
- what are the obligations of the national authorities with regard to explanation 
and persuasion? 
- what roles will the European institutions play in the synergies which will have to 
be  created between all  players? 
- how should the public authorities and the private sector be brought into a part-
nership capable of meeting the needs of the public and  economic operators? 
Providing answers to these questions is  indeed the challenge which this workshop 
and  the Round Table in general must take up. 
As the Commission Member responsible for information, I will strive to meet the 
expectations and  allay the fears of the public so that the historic decision taken at 
the Madrid European Council obtains the widest possible support and  secures the 
widest possible involvement of all  sections of society. 
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former President 
of  the  European  Commission 
The European Commission is to be congratulated for taking this initiative to launch 
work on the wide-ranging and  essential task of informing consumers, banks, busi-
nesses and public administrations about the single currency. The task is a mammoth 
one  ...  Last  night, Mr Yves-Thibault de Silguy  gave  us  an  exhaustive and  somewhat 
daunting picture of the amount of work to be done at political, economic and tech-
nical level by all the leading players in economic life, without forgetting the extreme-
ly delicate task of managing the transition on the international currency and capital 
markets. 
Public  opinion, for  its  part, is  becoming increasingly sceptical about the merits of 
European integration itself. These doubts are being exacerbated by the discussions 
that have been gathering momentum in  many quarters about economic and mone-
tary union and the chances of achieving it within the planned timetable. 
It  might therefore be useful, I think, to put the moves to introduce a single curren-
cy in  context by taking a look at recent history and then at the future prospects for 
European integration. 
The lessons to be drawn from rec·ent history 
At its  meeting  in  Hanover  in  June  1988, the  European  Council  recalled  that: 'in 
adopting the Single Act, the Member States confirmed the objective of progressive 
realization of economic and monetary union'. 
Progress towards the  1992 objective - the large frontier-free market - was by 
then becoming tangible. Three months earlier, the Heads of State or Government 
had agreed on a kind of financial 'constitution' for Europe which confirmed, among 
other things, the aim  of  economic and  social  cohesion, a  principle  of solidarity 
enshrined in  the Single Act. Economic growth had  picked  up  in  Europe, and unem-
ployment was  on a  downward  trend. And, importantly for our topic  today, the 
European  Monetary System was going from  strength to strength and demonstrat-
ing  its  operational effectiveness  in  helping to achieve economic stability and  con-
vergence. 
It was against this background, and drawing extensively on the Werner Report, that 
the expert committee set up  by the Hanover European Council carried out its task. 
In April  1989, the committee presented its  report, which was broadly endorsed, in 
particular as regards the three-stage approach to economic and monetary union, by 
the Intergovernmental  Conference. The IGC  nevertheless added, in  what was  to 
become the Maastricht Treaty, a set of concrete criteria that had to be fulfilled  by 
countries wishing to move to the third stage. It  is  precisely these criteria which lie 
67 at the heart of the current discussions, in  an economic and social climate that can 
only be described as  less promising than in  1988. 
Let me point out in  passing that the Intergovernmental Conference discussed, at my 
request, the possibility of including employment-related criteria, but decided not to 
do so. I will  come back to this point later. 
I have  touched upon this episode in  order to bring out more clearly what was, in 
my view, the central message of the report by the 16 experts, who included the gov-
ernors of all  the central banks, figures  who surely cannot be regarded as anything 
less than the most stalwart defenders of orthodox thinking. 
Allow me to quote a few passages from their conclusions: 
'The completion of the single  market will  (  ... ) significantly  increase the degree of 
economic integration within the Community. It will  also entail profound structural 
changes in the economies of the member countries. (  ... ) Many of the potential gains 
can  only materialize if economic policy - at both national and Community levels 
- responds adequately to the structural changes. (  ... ) It will, therefore, necessitate 
a  more  effective  coordination  of  policy  between  separate  national  authorities. 
Furthermore, Community policies  in  support of a  broadly  balanced  development 
are an indispensable complement to the single market.' 
Without indulging in any personal pride-for the report was a collective effort-
it seems to me that these recommendations deserve to be meditated upon, espe-
cially  as  they have  been further highlighted  by  the currency movements that have 
taken place since September 1992 and  by the excessive formality which is  still the 
hallmark of the mutual economic surveillance exercises.  The recommendations pro-
vide food for thought if we are to overcome public reluctance and misgivings and, 
further still, achieve a lasting economic and  monetary union. 
In  other words, our economic integration efforts will  yield  all  the desired  results 
only if a number of conditions are met: 
- the single market must be completed and deepened and special attention must 
be paid  to the conditions in  which small  and  medium-sized enterprises can be 
started up and expand; 
- a system of·more or less  fixed  exchange  rates will  have  to be introduced -
along the lines of the EMS- between the countries that form part of the eco-
nomic and monetary union and those remaining - temporarily or lastingly -
outside; 
- the  economic  and  monetary  union  must be  given  the ability  to  implement 
Community; policies, with sufficient resources to achieve internal solidarity, facil-
itate the necessary structural changes, develop human resources, skills and tech-
nologies; 
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kind  of  'economic  government'  capable  of  defining  and  achieving  common 
objectives in the field of economic and  social  development. Setting an  econom-
ic government in place is more a matter of political will than of  far-reaching insti-
tutional change, although  simpler, more transparent procedures would help to 
make our societies more democratic, and  this would not go unnoticed by  pub-
lic opinion. 
It could  even  be  argued  that the  success  of the  1999  objective  is  dependent, to 
some extent at least, on real progress being made between  1996 and  1998 in coor-
dinating economic policies and strengthening Community action. It was with that in 
mind that we drew up  the White Paper  on growth, competitiveness and  employ-
ment,  the  policy  document  which  we  presented  to  the  European  Council  in 
December  1993. Some  speakers  mentioned the White Paper yesterday, deploring 
the fact that not all  of its recommendations were being implemented, despite the 
Commission's efforts. 
But I would like to come back now to the refusal to include employment in the cri-
teria laid  down in  the Treaty. The debate will be  re-opened, at the request of cer-
tain countries, during the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference; the question 
already reared its head during the discussions of the working group responsible for 
preparing the IGC. 
We must address that question here and  now. The opponents of European integra-
tion are  brandishing  slogans  on  the theme  of 'the single  currency means  unem-
ployment', a claim which is not only untrue from a strictly economic standpoint but 
also  dangerous  politically. Some  supporters of economic and  monetary union  hit 
back with 'the single currency means lots of jobs tomorrow'. This is  only part of the 
picture and, above all,  is  liable to prove  unconvincing in  today's  climate of lasting, 
massive unemployment. 
That is why we must combine a strong currency with job creation right now by sup-
porting  growth  through  implementing  a  strategy  of cooperation  between  the· 
Member States, pursuing more active labour-market policies and  including the envi-
ronment and  leisure time in our development model. 
This could form the basis  of a confidence pact between the countries most likely 
to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, with the aim of putting political and social objectives 
back into the centre of the cooperative strategy for growth.  This would put us  in  a 
stronger position to bring out the major benefits which.a single currency will bring 
for Europe's  internal prosperity and  its  external influence. It is  from Europe that 
people are  expecting proposals for a world economic and  monetary order which 
is  both fairer and  more efficient. 
The future: EMU as one of the pillars of  political union 
In  order to map  out the way ahead, European  leaders, after discussions that were 
sometimes long and  difficult, marked their progress, from June  1989 to December 
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tion of a timetable for introducing the single  currency. They ended up deciding to 
hold two conferences, thereby stressing the link between  political  and  economic 
integration. 
Since  the adoption of the report by the expert committee on EMU  in June  1989, 
events of great historic significance have put the Community to the test: the fall  of 
the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the communist system and German unification have 
cast the challenge of European integration in a different light. For some, there was 
no longer any need to pursue this course since the end of the Cold War had  dis-
pelled the threat which had  cemented the European  countries together so  effec-
tively; for others, on the contrary, German unification, by  increasing the weight of 
Germany in Europe, made it all the more urgent to bind European countries to one 
another in an  irreversible process. 
We too often lose sight today, blinkered as we are by budgetary and monetary con-
straints, of the political purpose of European  integration. In  other words, through 
failing to mention the aims of our collective action, we are faced  with the impossi-
ble task of presenting the means as  if they were an  end  in  themselves. That is  why 
the case  for the single  currency must be  based  on the desire to live  together in 
peace, solidarity and democracy and  the need for European unity in order to face 
up to the challenges of globalization. 
As  several  Heads  of Government like to remind us, the  economic and  monetary 
structure we have built needs a political roof overhead.  The idea is not to boil down 
the whole issue  to a one-line slogan  like 'Europe is  the single  currency plus  com-
mon defence'. No, what is  vital for the continuation of European integration is  not 
only a common willingness but also an institutional architecture which enables that 
willingness to be given concrete expression, with clarity but in a process that moves 
forward gradually (we have to be  realistic). 
We must therefore strike the right balance  between  political  power on  the one 
hand and economic and monetary power on the other. In this way we will make the 
venture more understandable to the public and  more convincing to all  concerned. 
I realize that I have  fleetingly taken  you  some distance away from the huge  prob-
lems which this Round Table has to tackle and on whose solution the acceptability, 
and  then the success, of the single currency will depend. 
But times are hard for Europe, confidence is  being undermined by  doubt, patience 
is running out and  reawakenings of national feeling are only making matters worse. 
Our duty is more than ever to point up the historic challenges facing our European 
countries, which are threatened, whether they like it or not, with a form of politi-
cal and  economic decline. Simply look at the upheavals in the world around us, the 
new powers taking shape and  the new risks emerging. But we are not condemned 
to be sidelined if we manage to unite while respecting our diversity. 
We must therefore also  avoid  the risk of imbalance which would only exacerbate 
the  criticisms  levelled  against  what our  opponents  call  the  supranational  tech-
70 nocrats and  global elites. I would stress, without fear of repeating myself, that the 
single  currency must serve an  economic and  social  development strategy which  is 
discussed  democratically and  the  broad  lines  of which  are  then  adopted  by  the 
European  Council.  There  is  no  point  in  having  economic  integration  unless  it 
enables  the  countries  involved  to achieve  their  ideals  and  priorities:  peace  and 
mutual  understanding  between  peoples;  equality  of  opportunity  in  education, 
employment and  health; security and  respect for citizens' rights  ... 
Seen in this way, the single currency will gain acceptance - in a context of renewed 
dynamism - as  the key factor for achieving economic growth and  social  progress 
within the Union and  the essential tool enabling the Union to contribute to a bet-
ter world order. 
71 4. I 2.  Lord Jenkins of Hiffhead, former President 
of the  European  Commission 
Following the shock of the first oil  crisis, and following immediately too a peculiar-
ly  negative European Council, I decided that the best chance of getting Europe mov-
ing again, was to reproclaim the goal of monetary union not as a remote and theo-
retical  goal  but as  something towards which  early and  rapid  progress could  and 
should be made. I have  never regretted that decision, nor wavered in  my  belief that 
it was by far the most powerful and practical way forward as  it is  today. In  the  18 
months  or so  between  then  and  the  coming  into  operation  of the  European 
Monetary System, we were favoured for once with immense good luck. There was 
the solid  foundation  of the Werner report which  made  it  accepted  respectable 
Community doctrine. 
Though it must be said that not much had been done by governments to implement 
the Werner report in the intervening seven years. Also, the next piece of good luck 
was in  that winter of 1977-78, a very weak performance by the dollar which was a 
substantial  influence on Helmut Schmidt's  dramatic conversion in  February  1978. 
At that stage President Giscard was somewhat preoccupied with the difficult French 
parliamentary elections. But as  soon as that was over, he was at least as enthusias-
tic as Helmut Schmidt. Thereafter all  the players on the European stage behaved as 
though  they  were  performing  well  rehearsed  and  familiar  roles  which  the 
Commission and France and Germany agreed. 
Messrs j. Delors and Lord Jenkins, 
former  presidents of the European  Commission. 
Action was practical and  it could be fast.  It  was 
not that they were the only ones with European 
fervour,  the  others  were  at  least  as  eager  to 
move but the two were the only ones who had 
the  necessary  combination  of  fervour  and 
power.  Britain, of course, and  to my  deep cha-
grin, as it was  partly my scheme, stood more or 
less  benevolently on the sidelines  until  no less 
than  11112 years later; choosing what was always 
the worst of all  possible moments from her own 
and  the European point of view, decided at last 
to enter the exchange-rate mechanism, thereby 
vividly illustrating that a policy of wait and see so 
far from guaranteeing calm wisdom is just as like-
ly, with a deadly accuracy, to get you to the worst 
of both worlds. 
Of course, the creation of the EMS was only a small step in  the direction of the sin-
gle  currency. But it was  an  important one and  one which  I certainly intended to 
start a journey which led the whole way. So MrVice-president, what are the lessons 
which  I can  draw from  these events for the final  and crucial stage of that journey 
which starts from this  Round Table today? Well first  I'  would say  adventurousness 
pays: there are some things that can be better achieved by a qualitative leap than by 
a centipede's steps. 
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That is  a recipe for never getting there at all. 
But none the less, and third, late starters must be allowed and indeed encouraged 
to catch up. There is  all  the difference in. the world between some countries going 
ahead to blaze a trail and permanently splitting Europe. 
Fourth, the stakes are very high on the single currency now. It  is  my view that if we 
failed  to achieve  it, then one would  be very unlikely  to see any  other significant 
advance in  Europe for years to come. 
Fifth, the informing and persuading of public opinion is  of course vital  but that is  a 
task which should be approached with confidence and enthusiasm because there is 
a very strong popular case for the single currency. It  is  far from being just a matter 
of abstruse economic  policy  and  bankers'  technicalities. The savings  and  conve-
nience to ordinary people in  not paying a forfeit, the octroi, of exchange dealings can 
be very considerable indeed. 
But, and this is  my sixth and  last point, any popular case can be much more accept-
ably deployed in  a buoyant economic climate with falling  unemployment than with 
stagnancy and weak growth. 
John  Maynard  Keynes  died  50  years  ago  this  spring.  Some  of his  doctrines  are 
unfashionable  today.  Crude Keynesianism  no doubt has  its  limitations  but it  is  a 
good deal better than the crude pre-Keynesianism in which we are only too inclined 
to fall  back. 
We should not forget the splendid third quarter of this century, splendid for peo-
ple's prosperity and splendid for the European advance which owed a great deal to 
Keynes' thought and doctrines. But above all  we should not forget what I regard as 
his  spirit of rational  panache, of rational  adventure, the belief that problems are 
there to be solved by which above all  he stood. It  is  by determined optimism, tem-
pered by  realism certainly, but not by defeatism, that we will  get a single currency 
and both ease its birth and celebrate its baptism by ensuring that they coincide with 
a renewal of growth, employment and optimism in  Europe. 
73 Mr K.  Honsch, 
4.13.  Mr  Hansch} 
President of  the  European  Parliament 
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the European  Parliament. I am  pleased that this 
important, three-day Round Table conference on the introduction of the European 
currency is  being held here. 
Thank you all  for your contributions to our deliberations on  how we  can  better, 
no, best inform the European public about the introduction of the single  currency. 
I would particularly like to thank President Santer and  Commissioner de Silguy for 
making  this  meeting possible  through  their personal  commitment and  their cir-
cumspection and  for ensuring so wide a response. 
The entry into force of the Treaties of Rome, the decision on the 
completion of the internal market and the opening of the frontiers 
bear no comparison with the launching of the third stage of mon-
etary union. Issuing  a single  currency  has  a completely different 
dimension  from everything previously  decided  in  the process  of 
Europe's unification. 
For the first time a European  decision has  implications which will 
affect each  citizen directly, which he can  immediately recognize and 
which are truly tangible. 
There is  no doubt about it: we need  a wide-ranging information 
campaign  on the introduction of the European currency. You  have 
discussed  this  at  length.  Let me  just mention  a  few  aspects  to 
which I believe particular attention should be  paid. 
Some people object that it will be  too expensive. But it is  easier 
to accept this accusation today than the accusation tomorrow that 
we did not even try to inform the public fully. 
President of  the European  Parliament 
The public are not yet prepared for the introduction of the single 
currency. There are anxieties. There are misunderstandings. 
We are having to deal with the historical experience that I 5 different nations have 
had  with national currencies and  15  different mixtures of anxiety and  identity. This 
must be considered very carefully.The information campaign must be aimed at what 
the public now know, at their opinions and  their prejudices. And these, of course, 
differ  from  one  Member State  to  another.  In  the  minds  of many  people  - in 
Germany at least - monetary union and  monetary reform are synonymous. They 
believe that the new money will mean a devaluation of the old money- and, there-
fore, of their savings. We know that this is  objectively wrong, but many members of 
the public do not. Unless politicians, banks and social organizations succeed in  mak-
ing it clear that money will retain its value, monetary union will not be  approved. 
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what it is  not. 
This will sound trite to all  the experts. I tell you  that this  is  not so for the people 
who are supposed to put the new currency in their pockets. Nor would monetary 
union be  the first great reform in  history to come to grief because  of trite misun-
derstandings. 
The  information  campaign  cannot  be  confined  to advancing  a few arguments  in 
favour of the Euro for public consumption. It must also unmask the implausible and 
expose the inconsistencies. I will give two examples: it is  being said  that the intro-
duction of the single currency is  a recipe for European  recession. A  day  before or 
later, the same  people warn that the Euro is  a recipe for inflation. It is  claimed that 
a European currency is worthwhile only if everyone, or almost everyone, takes part 
from the outset, and  reference  is  made  in  this context to Member States that are 
still  a  long  way  from  satisfying  the  convergence  criteria. And  the  same  people 
demand that compliance with the convergence criteria be given priority over com-
pliance with the timetable. 
There is  a need for debate. The aim of the information campaign  must be to dispel 
anxieties and  misunderstandings, not to exacerbate them. 
We  have  a valid  treaty.  In  the public  debate  there  is  an  underlying attitude that 
would have  us  believe  that the decision  on the  European  currency has  still to be 
taken. Debate on the technical details of the introduction of the Euro is, of course, 
necessary. It is  also  bound to be a heated debate, and  there is  nothing wrong with 
that. But we must never allow it to be forgotten that there is an  international treaty 
in  which  13  countries have  undertaken to join a monetary union. 
Allow me a general comment in this context.  There are  I 0 years between the sign-
ing  of the  Maastricht Treaty  in  February  1992,  enshrining  the goal  of monetary 
union, and the year 2002, when the last step to achieve this goal is to be taken. That 
is  equivalent  to two  parliamentary  terms,  if all  goes  well. This  means  that  the 
European  currency project is  a challenge  to long-term politics. And this  is  some-
thing the public repeatedly demand: politicians must show themselves capable, with-
out looking ahead to the next elections and without becoming hostages to period-
ic  democratic change, of setting an  objective, of spending some considerable time 
preparing a decision that will not take immediate effect and of standing by that deci-
sion. That is  what we have  done  with the  decision  on  monetary union. Are the 
public now willing to join us in the long preparatory process?We have exposed our-
selves to the danger of having our ability to pursue democratic policies put to the 
test. The period of preparation must not become a period of erosion. 
Anyone who day after day expresses fresh  speculation in  this difficult area triggers 
speculation and  is  working on a self-fulfilling prophecy. Not only the world's finan-
cial markets but the citizens of the Member States too will take the European Union 
and  European  policy seriously only if we too take the goals we have  set ourselves 
seriously. 
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launching of the third stage. It is  said  that the economic situation in  most Member 
States argues against it, as  does the social situation, unemployment is too high, and 
so on. And the calendar for the next four years includes a number of fundamental 
decisions for the European Union: 
- the ratification of the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference, 
- medium-term financial planning from  1999, 
- the reform of the agricultural and  structural policies, 
- the enlargement of the Union to include  East  European  countries, Malta and 
Cyprus. 
And we know these decisions have to be taken at a time of important national elec-
tions in  several  Member States. These are, of course, all  politically separate events. 
I am sure the proper distinctions are being made in Brussels. But they will merge in 
the political attitudes of the public, the citizens, and one will leave its imprint on the 
other. But there is  no ideal  time. Who can  say  today whether the Member States 
will be more willing and  able to comply with the convergence  criteria in  the year 
2000 than in  1997 or 1998, whether the call  for public employment programmes 
and the social pressure will be less pronounced then than today? And are not all the 
decisions interdependent? 
The Commission and Parliament, the European Monetary Institute and the Council 
must do their duty and conduct this campaign. 
But this will not be enough. The European currency is  not just a 'European issue': it 
is also a national objective. Not even the best and  most comprehensive information 
on the European currency can  replace political commitment to it. 
The new currency will be  accepted only if all  leading politicians and  a//  important 
political forces  in  the Member States  endorse the introduction of the single  cur-
rency with all the weight they carry. The European institutions, whose task it will be 
to  introduce  the  single  currency  step  by  step.  must not be  abandoned  in  this 
process. 
I have the impression that not everyone involved is sufficiently aware of this dimen-
sion of the acceptance of the common monetary union. 
Information is  good - confidence is  better. It is  not information leaflets that build 
confidence, but people. And  in  the end, the deciding factor will be  not what the 
public know but what they want. 
76 4.14.  Mr Pandolfi, 
former Treasury Minister of Italy 
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a privilege to be associated with this Round 
Table when the final  conclusions are being drafted. But this privilege carries with it 
some risks. After the precision and effectiveness of the exploratory discussions at 
yesterday's workshops, there is  in  particular the risk of becoming bogged down in 
generalities  or approximations.  In  trying to avoid  this  risk,  I take as  my  point of 
departure the clear report on the changeover to the single currency produced by 
the European Monetary Institute and adopted by the Madrid  European Council. 
The report sets out the timetable for the changeover. It  is  punctuated by  the four 
well-known dates between the beginning of 1998, when the decision will  be taken 
on the countries that will  take part in  Stage Ill  of monetary union, and the first half 
of the year 2002. I am firmly  convinced that the really critical period is the one this 
side  of  the  first  of these  four  dates,  namely  the  two  years  which  have  just 
started. It  is  over the next 24  months that everything is  to play  for; if we  let the 
moment slip, we are unlikely to recover. 
It  is  within this period that we have to set in  motion a sequence of developments, 
one that as  a rule shapes, political action, namely the sequence of communication, 
persuasion and consensus. To  leave it any later would be a mistake. 
I should like to avoid any misunderstandings. First, identifying the critical moment of 
the entire process as the next two years  in  no way  means ignoring the rest of the 
journey. On the contrary, as  the Commission has  done with this conference, it is 
crucial to lose no time in  launching the essential work of familiarizing the public at 
large and specialized interests with the objective of the single  currency. An  objec-
tive  perceived as a useful, desirable, feasible, natural event in  Europe's present situ-
ation and one which  is  necessary for its international competitiveness. 
The more that public opinion has taken on board, first, the actual idea· of the single 
currency and, second, the concept of the conversion  between the single  currency 
and the national currency - i.e. the reclassification of the value of goods and ser-
vices according to our new monetary masters - the more easily will  the balance 
between fear and conscious mistrust, on the one hand, and support and confidence, 
on the other, be tipped in  the right direction. 
The currency is  far  more than a simple instrument or a simple tool of economiC 
activity. Its  evocative connotations conjure up  the realm of anthropology. Nomisma 
was the name the Greeks gave to the currency, the equivalent of custom, habit, and 
consolidated and recognized usage. 
Second, concentrating attention on the critical  variables of these two years  does 
not mean underestimating the problems and difficulties that will  arise in  the ensu-
ing  period. 
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that everything else will follow automatically and  that day-to-day questions will be 
handled  as  a matter of course. There is  one period which deserves special  atten-
tion, the one which will be  marked at the start of 1999  by the irrevocable locking 
of exchange rates. It was  relatively easy for the central banks of the countries par-
ticipating in the European Monetary System exchange-rate agreements to steer the 
parity grid towards realistic and  sustainable values from the end of 1978 to March 
of the following year: these values then formed the basis for the decision establish-
ing the EMS. 
Nowadays, the scope for central bank intervention is constrained by the huge sums 
which  can  be  mobilized  and  moved  around  every day  on  the  foreign  exchanges. 
However, once the fixed  and  irrevocable parities  have  been  announced, they will 
remove all  room for manoeuvre. Market operators will therefore have to play all 
their best cards  before that date. To put it mildly, this will be a period that will have 
its complications. 
The  European  institutions, the  political  authorities and  the  monetary authorities 
will have to send clear, precise and unambiguous signals. All this confirms that every 
stage will throw up problems and  obstacles. 
Nevertheless, it is, to my mind, indisputable that the difficulties will peak around the 
time of the first fundamental decision on which countries will and will not partici-
pate. Other, smaller peaks  will occur later, a second one in  particular close, as  we 
have seen, to the irrevocable locking of exchange rates, but they will project above 
a median line of decreasing difficulties.  This scenario envisages significant differences 
of emphasis  in  terms of the intensity of political action as  compared with a purely 
diachronic approach. This matter could be discussed at length, but I prefer to con-
fine  myself to some selective comments. These consist of four observations and  a 
recommendation. 
First observation: Everything hangs together. If the single currency exercise is to be 
a success, public  opinion must be  quite firmly convinced  of its  merits and  must 
reach a stable consensus. Expectations, including economic expectations, count but 
what also  counts is  an  overall judgment on Europe. It is  the final  perception of its 
solidity  as  a  union,  of its  form,  of its  image. There  is  no  watertight  partition. 
Weaknesses or failures or feelings  of impotence in  the common foreign and  secu-
rity policy at times of international  crisis, when  there are  fears  for stability and 
peace, are factors weighty enough to disconcert the public profoundly. But that is 
only one  example  of the  fact  that now it is  more than  ever  necessary  for the 
European institutions to be in full control of the situation. Especially since the road 
to  the  single  currency  will  intersect  with  other  routes,  such  as  that  to  the 
Intergovernmental Conference for the revision of the Treaty, followed by the very 
delicate phase of ratification. Questions on political and monetary union are not on 
the agenda.  But the cause  of the single currency would not benefit from the per-
ception of difficulties and  tensions as the Intergovernmental Conference proceeds. 
Everything hangs together, even  the relationships between national political condi-
tions and  the objective of the single currency. 
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of political instability impeding the process now under way of reorganizing the pub-
lic finances of the economy and  making Italy's contribution to the Union objective-
ly less decisive at a crucial moment in  its history.  This contribution is  indispensable. 
It has  not been absent during other stages -very clear in  my memory- of eco-
nomic and  monetary integration, it cannot be  missing today. 
Second  observation:  We  must  not  misuse  Europe's  educational  role.  In  other 
words, we must not impose  on  Europe  as  pure  external  constraints  rules  which 
guarantee nothing other than the stable development of our national economies. It 
is right and proper to recall the conditions that must be met if we are to feel at one 
with Europe.lt is an additional, decisive argument, but it cannot be put forward sole-
ly  as  an  obligation  imposed  from outside. These  rules, and  more particularly the 
convergence rules enshrined in the Treaty, have been written by all, in the interests 
of all. But if we begin to feel that we are, as it were, being directed from abroad, this 
feeling  would  not be  conducive  to the  European  idea.  It prevents  Europe  from 
becoming rooted in  the popular consciousness. It is  up to governments and  politi-
cal  and  social  groupings to strike the right note when  referring to European  con-
straints.  We  must  show  no  indulgence  to  a  new  malaise  which  could  spread 
the feeling that we are subject to an  external authority. 
Third observation: Economic growth is  a crucial  variable. It would  be  somewhat 
conventional and  naive to imagine that the switchover to the single currency has to 
take place under full sail  with the following wind of buoyant economic entity. But it 
would be a lack of political realism to underestimate the adverse effects of an  eco-
nomic  slowdown  which  was  not  being  corrected  vigorously  enough. 
Unemployment must not be  allowed to become the endemic sickness  of end-of-
century Europe. We need  concerted policies. In  public opinion, the benefits we will 
derive  from  this  have  to  be  fused  with the  idea  of a Europe  which  is  stronger 
because it is  integrated and globally more competitive thanks to the strength of the 
single currency. 
Fourth observation: A  sensitive  issue  is  the relationship of the single  currency to 
the  outside  world. There  is  in  fact  a  well-known  tide  in  the  affairs  of Europe. 
Whenever the Community reality of Europe asserts itself as  a pole of the interna-
tional economic system, in one form or another, we see the outside world express-
ing  doubts, perplexities, fears  and  sometimes, in  certain  circles, even  barely  con-
cealed  hostility. This  happened  when  the  European  Monetary System  was  estab-
lished because there was uncertainty as to the role of a common policy with regard 
to the dollar and  again  when the single  market was  completed, on  that occasion 
because of the fear of a 'fortress Europe'. The same  is now true with the single cur-
rency in  prospect. It has  affected our conference, this Round Table  itself. Today, like 
yesterday, the European answer has to be calm and open. We have to clarify, explain 
and  convince. The single  currency is  not directed against anyone; all  that it will do 
is  strengthen the global economic system. The framework of our external relations 
is  the sure and  reliable framework we have  constructed during past decades. 
Lastly, a recommendation. The Commission has  been  right to organize this Round 
Table. But now, why not be  bolstered by  its success  and  move further ahead1 The 
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board for a more r.esolute  policy of action in the field of European information, of 
interactive  communication  between  institutions  and  citizens.  Literally, all  that  is 
needed  is  to open· wide the doors, now that we  have  the  means.  On  Internet, 
guided  by  the excellent hypertexts available, we  can  find  everything we need  to 
know about California's institutions and  legislation. 
We find very little on the Union whose citizens we are. That is  only a small exam-
ple of a great challenge. The success  of this Round Table  entitles us  to display con-
fidence. 
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President of  the  Consejo 
de  Ia  Editorial  del  Grupo  Recoletos 
Thank you, Mr Chairman. Ladies  and  gentlemen, I think everyone agrees  that the 
European Council meeting in  Madrid last December made a major step forward in 
the run-up to European  monetary union. The point was  made  by  other speakers 
today. At Madrid, the Heads of State or Government found a name for the single 
currency. discussed conversion guarantees for short- and  medium-term contracts, 
exchanged views  on  new issues  of public debt and  adopted the timetable for the 
changeover. But, even  more importantly, the Madrid meeting was the culmination of 
a process that began  in  1992/93, with some hesitations and  a certain scepticism, I 
will admit. Thanks to the fresh  impetus imparted at Madrid, however, we have  now 
entered a phase in which we will have to move quickly since, as Mr Pandolfi remind-
ed  us,  1998 is  fast approaching and  it will be  a crucial year. For those who believe 
in  the single  currency, we  must impart momentum to the process  and  we  must 
explain to our fellow citizens the advantages  and  disadvantages  of economic and 
monetary union. I would therefore like to congratulate the Commission for decid-
ing to hold this Round Table  and  extend my thanks for being invited to take  part. 
I  am  glad  that this  event  is  taking  place,  since  it will  set  the  ball  rolling  in  an 
extremely useful effort to disseminate information on monetary union in  Europe. 
With your permission, I would like to focus  on four topics which, in  my view, con-
tinue to be matters of concern. I will be  brief so as  to keep to the time I have been 
allotted. 
The first problem we have to address has to do with the very nature of the process. 
I am  one of those who are convinced that the medium-term economic benefits of 
monetary union, for all EU  Member States, will be very considerable, and that these 
benefits should be  put under the spotlight. I am also one of those who believe that 
monetary union will bring not just economic and commercial benefits, but is  one of 
the cornerstones underpinning European political integration. I will make the point 
even  more strongly: I am  convinced of the advantages  of monetary union for my 
own country. Spain. And if I felt that these advantages were just limited to the econ-
omy and  if I did not believe in European political integration, then when I was  in  a 
position to advise  my country on  whether or not to support monetary union, I 
would perhaps have  been  hesitant because  I would have  said  to myself that failure 
of the move to the single currency would have  had  dramatic consequences for the 
whole of the European Union. But I believe that, in  addition to the economic ben-
efits of monetary union, there are other advantages which have  to be  brought out 
clearly.  Political  leaders  in  Europe  today  fall  into one of three groups: two small 
groups and  one large one forming the vast majority. Some are in  favour of mone-
tary union because  they want political  union: these people are  all  to be  found  in 
Germany. A  second group are opposed to monetary union because it would mean 
giving up some political and  monetary sovereignty: these people are all to be found 
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both monetary union and political  union, but I am  not sure that they fully  realize 
what this means in terms of commitment and in  terms of the difficulties to be over-
come, especially if we bear in  mind the problems of unemployment we are facing in 
our countries. 
There are therefore many  difficulties  to be overcome before we  can  achieve the 
twin goals of monetary union and  political  union. We must consequently always  be 
extremely clear and extremely frank in what we say to the public. The process lead-
ing  to monetary union  is  a political  process. Its  advantages are not limited to the 
commercial sphere. For the goal  of monetary union, we need to have  a vision for 
Europe, a long-term vision. There can  be no question of our citizens waking up one 
morning to discover that we  have  committed them to a  major  political  process 
without hitherto having  mentioned anything other than economic benefits: no, we 
must provide them with clear information from the outset. There is  a system that 
we have chosen, a system of negotiation, a system of gradual progress. And some of 
the major steps that have  been taken  in  the recent history of our countries are 
indeed success stories, for example the dismantling of tariff barriers to trade and 
the removal  of certain  constraints, but each  of these crucial  steps for  European 
integration forms part of a continuous process. 
The latest in  this series of steps, the move to a single currency, is  the most impor-
tant one so far.  It  is  not surprising, then, that it should give  rise to concerns, mis-
givings  and difficulties. These misgivings  are of course exacerbated by  ignorance of 
all  the implications of introduction of the single currency. 
In  any event, the second phase  in  this integration process should take place over a 
fairly  short timescale. All  currency specialists in  general, and experts on the single 
currency  in  particular, believe  that the transition  should  be  got over with  fairly 
quickly once the decision is taken to introduce the single currency. One of the rea-
sons why  the transitional phase should  be kept short is  of course to reduce the 
risks of speculative movements. We have suffered a great deal from these specula-
tive movements in  the past, and they are not likely to disappear overnight between 
now and  1998. They could even become more acute if the date of the decision were 
to be postponed. We must therefore take this factor into account. 
Secondly, if the transitional period were to last too long, it could at times coincide 
with downturns in the economic cycle. The risk is therefore that the adverse effects 
might be blamed on the convergence criteria and the other economic targets to be 
met for  monetary  union. As  you  know,  the  economic  outlook  is  poor at  the 
moment, and this is  often blamed on the efforts to meet the convergence criteria: 
such  is  the rumour which  is  spreading among public opinion. And yet the experts 
know perfectly well that the opposite is true  .Therefore I feel we must try to explain 
to those who are hostile to the integration process the reasons why we must strive 
towards convergence.  We should explain how the economic system works and why 
these ups and downs form part of the normal economic cycle. 
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been going on for some time should  reach its  peak and  give  way to a downward 
trend, which accounts for the situation today. Those countries which have not sta-
bilized  their economies sufficiently  by  1998 in  order to qualify for  EMU  member-
ship are liable to run into trouble. I do not have a crystal ball, I just make the usual 
calculations based on the length of the cycle. Those countries will  have drifted even 
further  away  from  the  Maastricht  convergence  criteria and  from  the  countries 
which  have  fulfilled  them. I therefore  believe  that it  is  important to keep  to the 
planned timetable in  order to prevent the gap widening between different groups -
of countries. 
The third difficulty- and here I am  drawing near to the end of my talk- is  that 
monetary integration is  an  open cooperation process which is  supposed in  princi-
ple not to exclude anyone. This was the only feasible option, but it means that, from 
1999 onwards, the countries belonging to the monetary union will  have to co-exist 
with  those not participating from  the outset, and  there are  risks  of competitive 
devaluations  if  cooperation between the two groups of countries  is  not ensured. 
The fear  is  that, in  such a  situation, monetary union  might take  place  between a 
large number of countries whose structural differences are too great. Wisdom and 
the text of the Treaty should help us to take the right decision. 
I now come to a  point which  is  closely  bound  up  with  the organization  of this 
Round Table. Ladies and gentlemen, the monetary integration process which we are 
entering into is  associated in  the historical  memories of our people with the idea 
of currency reforms. Such  reforms are also generally associated with failure of the 
previous  economic  and  monetary  cycle.  Our citizens  are  therefore  under  the 
impression that a new currency is  being  created because the previous cycle with 
the existing currency has  proved a failure. That is,  in  the minds of the public, the 
situation in  which Europe finds  itself today. But it is  not the case. We are not start-
ing from failure. For example, a country which currently has an  inflation rate of 4.2 
to 4.3%, like Spain, has for several years been bringing its rate of inflation under con-
trol, although  it  has  traditionally  been  a  high-inflation  country.  People  therefore 
wonder, of course, why they need to have a new currency if their own is doing well. 
This shock cannot be avoided. All  currency reforms, all  changes of monetary unit 
have  created some anxiety about the future, some uneasiness at the loss  of the 
national currency. Why? Because there was a failure with the previous currency, and 
people thought that, since there had been a failure, there was no reason why things 
should improve in  future. But today, the situation is  completely different. Our cur-
rencies are more stable than they have been in  the past. In  some cases, the nation-
al  currencies  have  enjoyed  a  brilliant  career, a  long  life  cycle;  they  have  proved 
stable and exceptionally strong. I believe we have  to explain to everyone that the 
new single currency is not going to be weaker than the existing national ones: it will 
be better than, or at least as  stable as, the currencies it will  replace. And through 
budgetary policy and the general coordination that everyone is  advocating, we will 
be able to guarantee the stability of the new currency. 
I am glad to be living at this exciting time.l am convinced of the economic and com-
mercial benefits which the new currency will  bring. I have no doubt that the process 
83 is irreversible, but I am also perfectly aware that we have not yet solved all the prob-
lems. For those who believe  in  monetary integration, for those who believe that it 
is  an  essential  step, for those who believe  that political integration should  be  the 
ultimate objective of all our countries and of Europe as a whole, we must do every-
thing possible, we must leave no stone unturned, in order to minimize the risks, allay 
the  anxieties  of our citizens  and  make  them  aware  of the  benefits  which  this 
European currency will bring. Thank you. 
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former  Prime  Minister 
of  the  Grand  Duchy of Luxembourg 
Thank you, Mr  Andriessen. I am  Pierre Werner. Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, 
I should like first of all  to congratulate the representatives of the Commission, Mr 
Santer  and  the competent member of the  Commission, Mr de  Silguy,  for having 
taken the initiative in very good time, even  if it could even  be  said that it  was at the 
last minute, because  the period available, as  everyone seems  to be  saying, is  short. 
We have to thank them for organizing this and  I thank them very particularly for 
still  asking  me  to joint this  Committee of Patrons, even  though  I have  long since 
retired. 
I have  listened closely to the speeches delivered in the last few days; I was  particu-
larly impressed by the one given  two days  ago  by  President Dini, who has  a very 
eloquent and  persuasive way of setting out the advantages of economic and  mone-
tary union. 
I am  also pleased that the President of the European Parliament, this morning, gave 
us  a positive message which I find very encouraging and which as  such  proves that 
there is  a unity of views among the highest authorities of the European Union. 
Now, I can  still make a small  contribution to this debate, above all of experience. I 
have  been involved in the plan for economic and  monetary union for more than 30 
years, and  I have  lived  through this period with 
much intensity, as was bound to be the case, from 
this  point of view. And I can  start by  drawing a 
conclusion  from  this.  Ladies  and  gentlemen, 
throughout this  period  and  all  the  period  that 
lies ahead  of us, there has  never been, and  there 
never will be, a moment I 00% propitious for the 
introduction of economic and  monetary union. 
All periods are marked by a variety of concerns, 
either political, social, or financial, when this type 
of project was  always  opposed. And  if you  look 
back over the whole history of the project, there 
is  certainly  no  international  treaty  which  has 
been  prepared  at such  length  through  difficult 
periods, and  which  has  matured  to the degree 
that  the  project  for  economic  and  monetary 
union has  matured. 
From  left to  right: Messrs  P.  Werner, 
former  Prime Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
j. Santer, President of the European  Commission, 
and V.  Giscard  d'Estaing,  former  President of the  French  Republic. 
If you simply remember some dates and  curiously enough they are always towards 
the end  of or at the beginning of a decade. In  1969, the Hague  European Council 
instructed the Commission and  in particular the Council to prepare a plan for eco-
nomic and  monetary union - first to make a report and  also to prepare a plan. 
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the confidence of Mr  Giscard d'Estaing at the time, was  presented to the govern-
ments in  October 1970. It  gave  rise  to some opposition, in  particular against  its 
institutional aspects. And  I would say that the body of the report, i.e. the method 
of approaching and achieving economic and monetary union, is  still  the same.And 
when  Mr  Delors chaired his  Committee much  later on, he  told me: 'Listen, I am 
starting by giving this Committee your 1970 report, it is an excellent working docu-
ment'.And when  I see everything that has  been decided  since, and  in  particular 
here, the very elaborate section of the Treaty of Maastricht, I can only say that a cer-
tain  line  has  been held throughout this period and the problem as such, the purely 
monetary problem, has not changed. And the premises of an economic and mone-
tary union have  not changed since. 
So, this  Maastricht Treaty is, after all, no surprise. It  is  no improvization. And  when 
I look at this  media  excitement which  is  being fermented  at the moment, I tell 
myself, but look, this has all  matured, it has  matured not only in  people's minds, but 
through the reforms already carried out within the Community and the European 
Union. And once again, from one decade to another, we have made progress, on the 
substance, not on the plans, but on the substance. The decade which followed, the 
1970s, when of course the international monetary system was shaken to its  core, 
was obviously not a very favourable period for making grand plans. But I remember, 
all  the same, that at the time, when floating exchange rates were all  the rage, the 
German Minister, Mr  Schiller, proposed that the Community of Six, as  it then was, 
should float together, jointly, against the dollar.  It  would already have  been, if  you 
like, the monetary reform we were waiting for. And don't forget that if the common 
agricultural policy had been launched at the same time as a sort of monetary union, 
probably  many  of the disappointments  we  have  had  with  the agricultural  policy 
could have  been avoided. Therefore we have  been experimenting. 
And then, above all, the crowning event was, towards the end of 1978-79, the ini-
tiative  first  of Mr  Jenkins  at a  conference  in  Florence, and  then  of Mr  Giscard 
d'Estaing  and  Mr  Helmut Schmidt,  in  launching  the  European  Monetary  System 
which, despite some failings, served us well for a considerable period. And above all, 
which  also  enabled  us  to make  the first  experiments with  the mechanism  for a 
monetary union. 
Then, all  this was taken up again  later. And then, finally, in  late  1985, between 1985 
and  1989, the decision on the single market was taken, and it was interpreted as the 
equivalent of an internal market. 
Today, I wonder how it was possible to imagine that an internal market could func-
tion properly, with all the liberalization involved, other than at least in a slightly con-
certed or even unified  monetary landscape. Therefore, I believe it would be a dis-
service to all  those who put their trust in  the single market, with all  the liberaliza-
tion it has  brought about, if its  necessary complement were rejected. 
That is  what I have long argued, before and during my  political activities, and what I 
should simply like to argue today as  well. And when the problems which are real 
ones - real social problems - are brought up in this debate, I do not understand. 
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have to examine the causes and we will  find  that in  any case there is  not just one 
cause, but a number, and that the remedies also exist if we have the courage to take 
them. Above all  we must always compare like with like, it is always a mistake not to 
do so. We are now carrying out a  monetary reform, it  must be carried out with 
absolute transparency - a word which  I should also like  to become our guiding 
light - transparency. Transparency, particularly when we actually switch from the 
national  currencies to the single  currency. I have  lived  through all  this even  in  my 
own country, after the war. The public  must not have  the feeling that this conver-
sion conceals something underhand and they must be able to relate their purchas-
ing power after conversion to what it was before.  That, I believe, is absolutely essen-
tial. Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, I believe there is  no reason to derogate from 
the Treaty of Maastricht and that we must go forward with courage and determi-
nation, and above all  we have to believe in  what we are doing. And  if we believe in 
what we are doing, we will  also be very effective in  doing it. 
87 4.17.  Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing, 
former President of  France 
Members of the Commission, eminent persons who are with me on this platform 
- and  I am  pleased to be  included among you on this  Committee of Patrons -
ladies and gentlemen, our subject today is monetary union and  its relationship with 
public  opinion. This  initiative by  the Commission  is  an  auspicious  one and  I con-
gratulate Mr Santer and  Mr de  Silguy.  It is  an  initiative which  was  necessary and 
which will have  to be  repeated since  the element crucial to the success  of mone-
tary union is  clearly the psychological component and  the associated behaviour of 
public opinion. 
Let me  first remind you  that this  entire venture is  the embodiment of a political 
decision, as MrWerner put it so well, and this means two things: monetary union is 
part and  parcel of an  overall political plan  for European integration and  basically it 
will not be fully understood unless it is  seen  as  such. 
A  political decision, meaning that it concerns the public and  individuals, and, con-
trary to the impression which may be given by the current debate, to which I shall 
return, monetary union is  not designed to satisfy the demands of central bankers, 
who, incidentally, were generally hostile to begin  with - Mr Werner will bear me 
out on this. It is  designed, in fact, in a historical perspective, to satisfy more effec-
tively  the present and  future expectations of the European  public and  European 
business. Hence the overriding need to involve public opinion in a reform that was 
embarked upon with the interests of the public in mind. So this is  not packaging, it 
is  not propaganda, it is  the very essence of the undertaking which is at issue. If you 
would allow me, in  the short time at our disposal - and  one great step forward 
we  have  made  in  Europe  is  to require  speakers  to be  brief, particularly  in  the 
European  Parliament; it is  a very good discipline which counteracts  some  of our 
Latin  excesses - I shall  confine myself to three comments, first on the campaign 
now afoot to denigrate the European  currency, second  on  the  methods of per-
suading public opinion and  lastly on the entry into force of the single  currency. 
It was  you, Pierre Werner, who just now mentioned media excitement: at present 
we are  witnessing a serious  campaign  to denigrate monetary union in  which two 
groups are associated: the opponents of monetary union and the interests which it 
threatens. The campaign  is  a powerful one!  First, the political adversaries: we have 
reminded them - and  it is  the President of the European Parliament, Mr Hansch, 
who recalled it just now-that the democratic decision has been taken, it has been 
taken in all our countries, by due process, in  some cases  parliamentary and in  oth-
ers by referendum, and  so  everyone is  obliged to respect it. This harassment must 
therefore cease. 
Then, the interests that are  under threat: we  must remind  public opinion of the 
huge financial profits derived from the instability of exchange rates and the costs of 
converting  one  currency  into  another.  And,  on  this  point,  I  would  ask  the 
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the Commission's work, on the profits that intermediaries of all  kinds derive from 
the  instability  of exchange  rates  in  the  European  Union  and  from  the  charges 
imposed for currency conversion. I am convinced that if these figures were widely 
known they would be a powerful object lesson for much of public opinion. 
My  second comment relates to ways  of influencing  public  opinion, this  being the 
subject  of this  symposium  and  the  one  on  which  the  previous  speakers  have 
expressed themselves  so  eloquently. First, we  have  to realize  one thing  which  I 
rarely hear said: this is  the greatest monetary change of all  time. There have  been 
monetary reforms, for example in  Germany, after the war, and  here and there, in 
other countries, such as our Benelux partners. But there has  never been a mone-
tary reform on this scale. Therefore for us who need it, it is  something we should 
be proud of;  Europe is  embarking on an  unprecedented and  hence daunting task, 
something that has never been achieved before. 
When it comes to persuasion, something in  which  I am  not an  expert, unlike  Mr 
Dauzier, who spoke  previously, and  unlike  the other contributors to the  Round 
Table, I should  like  to confine myself to two recommendations. First, there should 
be less talk of the transition and  more of the situation that will  be obtained after 
the transition. Individuals  nowadays, faced  with the current upheavals  of all  kinds, 
have a sort of aversion to change. So  if we concentrate on explaining the transition, 
we will  trigger negative reactions. It  is  almost as  if, when a family  decides to move 
to  a  more  comfortable, more spacious  and  more  pleasant  house, conversation 
focuses solely on the move itself and on the attendant worry, bother and risks and 
never on the house they are moving to. 
My second recommendation is  to tailor your communication campaign to the situ-
ation as  it will  then obtain, by  pegging it to the socio-cultural needs strongly felt by 
people today and which are, I believe, the need for simplicity and the need for secu-
rity. First, the need for simplicity is evident because, in the future, when people recall 
that  14  separate currencies were once used  in  the European  Union, it will  seem 
absurd. Especially  when  they are told that none of you  in  this  hall,  not even  the 
Members of the Commission, not even Mr de Silguy, can tell me in  a few words the 
present exchange rates between these currencies. They can't do it. And when it is 
explained that this was the system we were told was the ideal  one, the one that 
had to be protected, it will  all  seem quite extraordinary. 
The need for simplicity, with  prices being expressed in  one and the same way and 
with calculations being carried out in the same unit everywhere, whether these are 
balance-sheet, profit, savings, insurance or other calculations -this will  be seen as 
a considerable improvement. Naturally, only that section of the population current-
ly  using several currencies will  be concerned. And that section is  in the minority: all 
the same, it includes most businessmen, it includes many young people because they 
travel, either for their studies or on holiday, and these groups strongly feel the need 
for simplicity. 
The other need is  the need for security, about which not much has been said. And 
this need for security exists among large sections of the population, e.g. the elder-
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with  the unfair  competition stemming from  currency adjustments, for farmers, as 
we recalled just now, since monetary upheavals have seriously disrupted European 
agriculture in  the past; therefore the security of using a single currency is, I believe, 
a powerful psychological incentive to use in  your future communication campaign. 
I now come to my  third comment, which  is  connected with the current campaign 
and with the political debates now taking place almost everywhere in the European 
Union. And it is  this: the transition to the single currency cannot be managed suc-
cessfully, in  terms of public opinion, if uncertainty exists as  to both the number of 
participants and the date on which the single currency enters into force. It cannot 
be managed because it is  impossible for the man  in  the street to read the question 
'who will  be in  the monetary union?', and  then 'when will  it start!' every day  and 
then accept that this event is something to be welcomed which will simplify his day-
to-day existence. That is  something the opponents of monetary union have under-
stood only too well, and they play  on each of these two scenarios  in  turn: which 
countries will form part of the monetary union and what will  be the date on which 
it starts! 
In  my  view, it is  therefore absolutely essential, for the credibility of the system, to 
keep to I January  1999 as the date on which monetary union comes into force, and 
I should like to examine this requirement more closely. I would ask you to note in 
passing, and it is  moreover what is  so clever of those who argue that the starting 
date should be postponed, that, if the date had to be put back, the Maastricht Treaty 
would  have to be formally  revised and therefore all  our countries would  have  to 
embark on the political  and  parliamentary procedure this would entail: I wish you 
much  joy. 
What in  fact are the arguments for not keeping to the date? They are the follow-
ing: that the Member States, in  particular Germany and France, will not be in  a posi-
tion to meet the Maastricht Treaty criteria on I January 1999.They will not be ready 
to meet them, we are told, because of the deflationary effect on tax revenue and 
because of the present economic slowdown. And the argument goes on to say that, 
if these countries were to try harder to meet the Maastricht criteria, they would 
accentuate the recessionary tendencies  in  their economies and  would  probably 
exacerbate the employment situation. That is  the argument of those who maintain 
that we will  be unable to keep to the date of I January  1999. 
In  the case of France, to give  you some figures, the government has, as you  know, 
projected a growth rate of 2.8% for the economy in  1996; if, for example, econom-
ic growth were one percentage point lower, that would represent a tax shortfall of 
the order of FF  40 billion, and  FF  40 billion  represents 0.5%  of the Maastricht cri-
teria. That is  to say  that this gives  us  half a percentage point more to make up, it 
increases the effort to meet the Maastricht criteria by  half of a percentage point. 
The same is  true for the Benelux countries and for Germany. 
So the argument runs: either the criteria have to be modified, or the date has to be 
put back. And the press has  taken up this chorus with enthusiasm, without reveal-
ing whether it is  a chorus of despair or of glee. 
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the project, which  has  existed since the Werner Report of  1970, namely  conver-
gence. When the idea of the single  currency was conceived, at the time, and  ever 
since, it was never said that we had to attain any particular growth rate in  absolute 
value or any particular situation in  relation to the outside world; the principle was 
that the group of countries which intended to adopt a single currency should be in 
a convergence situation, that is that economic and monetary developments in those 
countries should be convergent. 
First, a simple comment to illustrate the debate. At the present time, the tenden-
cies for the economy to slow down, which have, of course, quite adverse and unto-
ward repercussions, do not conflict with convergence since they are now unfortu-
nately apparent in  all  the countries concerned. Virtually the same tendency is  dis-
cernible in  Germany, in  France, in  some of our Benelux partners; it  is  therefore a 
situation which is  regrettable, but it is  a convergence situation. 
What do I recommend here? First, it is essential to keep to the date. And the polit-
ical  will  must be completely unambiguous among the leaders of the countries in 
question. That is,  in  fact, the case, but it  has  to be  restated at every opportunity. 
Moreover, and  this  is  a  more recent factor, while  respecting the Treaty, we  must 
eliminate the deflationary effect of seeking to meet the Maastricht criteria and, in 
my view, this is  possible. I will  have to be slightly technical for a few moments and  I 
apologize for this, but all  the same I should like to explain the idea. 
I shall  confine myself to the criteria for government deficits, which, as  you  know, 
have to be under 3% of GOP. It  is  clear that the revenue shortfalls due to the slow-
down in growth take us farther away from the Maastricht criteria. But it is  here that 
we need to take a much closer look at the Treaty. It  is,  moreover, very striking to 
see that on these subjects assertions are made which  demonstrate a widespread 
misreading of the facts or the texts. First, it  is  thought that the Maastricht criteria 
apply only to the countries that will form part of the monetary union. That is  quite 
wrong! The Maastricht criteria apply to all the members of the European Union and 
they do not appear in the section of the Treaty dealing with monetary matters.  They 
are found in  the section dealing with the economic policy of the European Union. I 
have with me copies of the  Treaties of Rome and of Maastricht, both of which I keep 
on my  bedside table, like  all  of you, both to fuel  my  European faith,  my  European 
conviction, and also as  a powerful aid  in  fighting insomnia. 
The Maastricht criteria are referred to in  three places  in  the Treaty. Article  I  04c 
stipulates that 'Member States' - that is,  everyone -'shall avoid  excessive gov-
ernment deficits' and  explains this  in  greater detail  in  paragraph 2, indicating that 
there are criteria for monitoring excessive public deficits. Further on, when mone-
tary union  is  mentioned, it says  that the countries, in  order to enter the monetary 
union, will  have to respect the terms of  Article  I 04c.Therefore the reference to the 
criteria is  not in  the section on monetary union, but in the general part.And no fig-
ure is given. The figures are contained in  an annex and it is  an  annex that relates to 
Article I 04c, i.e. to excessive government deficits and not to monetary matters.The 
monetary section refers merely to excessive government deficits. Now, if you read 
paragraph 2 of  Article  I 04c, what does it say? The Commission ... in  particular shall 
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teria: whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domes-
tic product exceeds a reference value' - therefore this applies to all  the Member 
States -'unless either the ratio has  declined  substantially and  continuously and 
reached a level  that comes close to the reference value' - we can  leave this  pro-
vision on one side since we are not satisfied with a trend approach, but the second 
point is  very important -'or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value  is 
only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value.' 
So  my  proposal is  the following: it is  to manage the matter of the Maastricht crite-
ria  by  disregarding the effect of recession and  by  applying the second provision of 
Article  I  04c.And so, with a view to applying these criteria, to calculate the trend of 
tax revenue on the basis of the potential rate of non-inflationary growth over two 
reference years, as defined by the central banks. I apologize, all this will seem some-
what complicated to you, at any rate to some of you, but I assure you it is  not. For 
example, if we take  1996  for  France, the central bank recently mapped out mon-
etary policy for 1996. It is  projecting 5% growth in the money supply, and it has cal-
culated this  on the basis  of a 2.5%  potential non-inflationary growth rate for the 
French economy in  1996. So that would be inflation-free growth. Well, obviously, it 
would be wonderful if we had inflation-free growth and if, at the same time, the cor-
responding revenue met the Maastricht criteria. But if we have a recession, i.e. if our 
revenue is  temporarily lower, do we have to increase the reference value as  com-
pared with  the Maastricht criteria or, on the contrary, do we base the reference 
value on the normal inflation-free growth rate? My proposal is  therefore to ask the 
Finance Ministers Council, guided  by the Member of the Commission responsible, 
Mr de Silguy, to start thinking about how exactly the reference criteria will  be cal-
culated in  1997, and I ask that the trend of tax revenue be calculated excluding the 
effect of recession. If you do so, you  deprive all  those who maintain that the appli-
cation of these criteria leads to a deflationary policy of a powerful argument while, 
at the same time, you remain entirely in  line with financial  orthodoxy since you are 
calculating your revenue on the basis of the non-inflationary growth rate projected 
by the central banks. 
There, ladies and gentlemen, I have argued at some length, but that is  what I want-
ed to say on this topic of monetary union, which is  so important. So important for 
history. so important for Europe, so important for each and every one of us.  And 
the feeling of this symposium, certainly, and what we have derived from it, is that we 
have  no alternative but to make a success of monetary union, to make  monetary 
union  part of the consciousness of Europeans, of the citizens of Europe, since it is 
the currency which will  make Europe. Thank you. 
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93 5.  Declaration by the Committee 
of  Patrons 
Economic and monetary union is an essential benefit for the future of our European 
Union  and  all  of the Union's  citizens  should  be  encouraged to  share  this  view. 
Without their support, Europe  cannot make  this  historic  step. There  is  already 
strong evidence that a majority of the Union's citizens are behind it. We believe the 
majority will  be overwhelming when all  fully  understand why a single currency will 
bring more advantages to their lives  than  IS  national varieties. 
This  means  embarking  on a  process of explanation. We want to help  people to 
understand that there are good practical reasons for wanting a single currency, and 
we want to help remove any anxieties and fears with which some may contemplate 
the change which lies ahead. 
The recent European Council in  Madrid has laid  down the path towards our desti-
nation of economic and monetary union. It  has  endorsed a broad scenario which 
tells us what will  happen and when. It has chosen a name for the new currency. We 
hope and believe that this new currency will  eventually command us  as  much alle-
giance, confidence and pride as  any of our existing national currencies. 
However, allegiance, confidence and  pride  can  only  ultimately  be  secured by  the 
Union's wise and good management of its currency. The Treaty on European Union 
has created structures, procedures and a political framework which should give this 
result. There is  no good reason to fear that policies and  practices which have  pro-
moted great strength and stability for some of our currencies will  somehow fail  to 
deliver similar benefits for members of our economic and monetary union. 
Creating understanding and encouraging people to be  relaxed about this vital  step 
in  the development of the European Union are basic tasks for the communications 
strategies which must be devised and implemented in the coming months and years. 
We are pleased to be part of the European Commission's initiative in organizing this 
Round Table, which we hope will encourage governments, public authorities and key 
sectors of civil  society to begin facing up to these tasks. 
It  is  not only the European Union and its  member governments which must give  a 
high  priority to communications. Every bank and financial  services company, every 
enterprise, be they manufacturers or retailers and  all  other organizations whose 
relationships with others are based on financial  transactions should be starting to 
think about what they will  need to do on this front. The day  will  come when they 
too will  need to explain what they are doing, to clarify their actions and to listen to 
the responses of those concerned. 
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authorities who must lead in  the quality and quantity of their communications. This 
Round Table  is  a  beginning. We hope that it will  stimulate everyone into devising 
programmes, projects and actions for promoting understanding and support for the 
single currency. 
Their aims will  be both broad and focused: broad because explanations and  justifi-
cations of the single currency must be addressed to all  sections of society; focused 
because the need for early and careful technical preparations must be understood 
by those organizations, including public authorities, banking systems and companies 
large and small, whose actions will  be the key to a smooth changeover. 
We believe that a carefully planned approach to communications and well  execut-
ed strategies will  play their part in  creating the essential ingredient for a successful 
changeover: confidence. 
If  we create confidence, our economic system  will  respond  to the challenge  by 
investing  more, by  seizing  new opportunities in  global  markets, by  creating more 
jobs and launching new companies. 
If we create confidence, then people will  accept that the new money is  just as reli-
able as the old, perhaps even more so. 
If we create confidence, people will  not fear the changeover as a leap  in  the dark, 
they will  have  understood the reasons for it, how it will  happen and the help they 
can expect to have in  dealing with important practical problems. 
Finally, if we create confidence, people will  feel  that they are not losing anything of 
fundamental importance with the disappearance of their national currency. Instead, 
they will  come to appreciate that by  putting their economies ever more closely 
together within the Union, they are gaining  a  strength and  a  power to influence 
their future economic affairs that is  presently denied to any single Member State. 
That has been our experience after nearly 40 years of building the European Union. 
Without it, our Member States would be less  in  control of their destinies and  less 
able to deliver prosperity and  security to their citizens. In  this world of immense 
political  uncertainty  where  events  are  increasingly  shaped  by  global  economic 
power, that is  why we need a stronger Union. 
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through monetary Europe, 
Monetary union and the single currency- the Euro- are not revolutionary ideas 
in  themselves; they logically constitute the next step in  Europe's monetary history. 
The exhibition 'A  time  journey through  monetary· Europe'  endeavoured to illus-
trate, with the aid  of original, artistic presentations, the development of money in 
Europe from earliest antiquity to the 21st century. In  the section of the exhibition 
focusing  on money as  we know it today, interactive information technologies and 
videos were used to explain contemporary monetary techniques. 
Separate exhibition rooms were devoted to three main periods. The journey began 
with Europe in the third and fourth centuries AD and a short history of the appear-
ance of metallic money from the sixth century BC  and pre-monetary mediums of 
exchange. The currencies used in the three main reforms that took place during the 
Roman  Empire (under Augustus, Caracalla and  Constantine) illustrated the theme 
of the quest for monetary stability. 
The visitor was then taken from the  16th to the  18th centuries, through the cen-
tral period in the development of monetary theories and practices. Examples of the 
first banknotes used from the end of the 17th century were on view. 
The first  two  rooms  were  separated  by  a  time  corridor giving  an  idea  of the 
changes that took place in  monetary instruments and techniques between the fifth 
and  I  5th centuries (Merovingian coinage, Carolingian reforms, coins of the I  Oth and 
I I  th centuries and those in  common use in  the 14th and  I  5th centuries). 
The time journey ended in  a contemporary room, the largest of the three, which 
presented the techniques in  use today for minting coins and printing banknotes, as 
well  as  current banking practices: electronic payment systems and bank cards and 
electronic  purses. Visitors  had  an  opportunity to familiarize  themselves with  the 
techniques  used  by  foreign  exchange  dealers  in  a  trading  room  equipped  with 
modern computer terminals, and to understand the workings of payment systems 
and electronic money. 
The visitor's  eye was  caught particularly  by  a  banker's  room  presented in  use: a 
Roman  banker, a  16th-century banker and  a modern trading room equipped with 
computers and an interactive system enabling the vis~tor to simulate financial trans-
actions. 
Collections of notes and coins from the I  5 Member States of the Union now in  cir-
culation and destined to be replaced by the Euro brought the time traveller back to 
the present day. 
97 Gee-economic wall  charts showed, for different periods, the flows of trade, money 
and  knowledge  enabling  a  common  human,  economic  and  monetary  area  to 
develop in  Europe, despite the vicissitudes of history. These underscored the unify-
ing role of money. 
The exhibition presented iconography (pictures, engravings, photographs) and spe-
cialized works dealing with banking technique and monetary theory, thereby appeal-
ing to both economists and art lovers. 
Specially produced video films  also explained what money is, how notes and  coins 
are produced, the advantages of the Euro and the scenario for moving to the single 
currency. 
Works by contemporary artists (pictures and  sculptures), created specially for the 
occasion as part of a project linking art and currency (the Ecume project), illustrat-
ed the theme of the single  currency and  rounded  off  this  journey through  the 
European monetary area. 
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Programme 
MONDAY 22 JANUARY  /996 
17.00-19.30  Introductory session 
- Welcome by  Mr Y-T. de Silguy, Member of the European Commission 
- Keynote address by  Mr  L. Dini, President of the European Council 
- Keynote address by  Mr  A. Lamfalussy, President of the  European  Monetary 
Institute 
- Debate with  EU  ministers and governors of central banks: Messrs  E. Catroga. 
K.  Clarke, W  F.  Duisenberg. E. A. J.  George. S.  Hamalainen,  P. Jaans, M. Jelved, V. 
Klime, K.  Liebscher, P.  Maystadt, M. O'Connell, L.  Papademos,  Y.  Papantoniou, G  .. 
Persson,  L.A. Rojo,  A.  J.  de  Sousa, J.  Thomsen, J-C. Trichet,  A. Verplaetse,  J. 
Viinanen, G. Zalm. 
Venue: European  Parliament, Espace  Leopold 
20.30-22.30  Welcoming dinner hosted  by  Mr  J.  Santer, President of the 
European Commission 
- Keynote addresses by  Messrs J. Arthuis, P. Solbes Mira, J-C. Juncker 
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Workshops 
Escorting the citizen and economic actors to monetary union 
9.00-17.30  The Round Table workshops 
Venue: European  Parliament, Espace  Leopold 
9.00-12.15  Morning session 
12.15-14.15  Lunch hosted by the European Commission 
- Keynote addresses by  Mr J. Delors and Lord jenkins 
14.15-17.30  Afternoon session 
Workshop  I 
Focus on the consumer 
Encouraging consumers and the general public as  a whole to adapt successfully to 
the single currency is a fundamentally important task for communications.Well-con-
ceived and well-prepared strategies will  be needed to respond effectively to con-
sumers' fears and anxieties while also making it as  easy as  possible for everyone to 
feel  comfortable with the daily  use of the new currency (notes and coins, savings, 
bank statements, cheques, invoices, tax forms, etc.). Both the educational system and 
the media, of course, will  be vital  channels, but by  no means the only ones. 
In  this workshop, consumers will  explain what they need to know and when. The 
potential  use of the educational  system, the important role for  retailers and the 
main  elements in  media strategies will  all  come under scrutiny. 
Main workshop objectives: 
I.  To  identify the main concerns of consumers about the changeover. 
2.  To  discuss  how communications  policies  can  respond to these concerns and 
create confidence in  the process. 
3.  To  discuss how the educational system can  help the changeover. 
4.  To  examine the main  issues connected with dual displays of currencies. 
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Morning 
9.00: Chairman's introduction: 
Mrs  C. Ockrent (L'Express) 
What should be the communication priori-
ties towards consumer audiences? 
Discussion introduced by:  Ms  E.  Bonino 
(European Commission) 
What  does  the  general  public  need  to 
know? 
Discussion introduced by: Mr M. M. Levy 
(Publicis),  Mrs  C.  Randzio-Piath 
(European  Parliament),  Ms  T.  Strom 
(Sveriges Konsumentrad) 
Debate: 
-What  information  will  be  useful  and 
when? 
- How to overcome fears and anxieties 
- How to avoid  information overload 
-What roles for organizations represent-
ing consumers, social partners and other 
groups? 
I  0.30-1 0.45: Coffee 
I 0.45: How helpful can opinion polls be  in 
responding to consumer concerns? 
Discussion  introduced  by:  Mr  P.  Gia-
cometti (IPSOS), Mr A. Papandropoulos 
(Association  of  European  Journalists),  Mr 
J.  Quatresooz  (International  Research 
Associates) 
Debate: 
-Which sources  of information  are  the 
most credible? 
-How  important is information targeting? 
-How to  cope  with  special  needs  (e.g. 
pensioners and the blind) 
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Afternoon 
12.15-14.15: Lunch 
14.15:  Chairman's  introduction:  Mr 
E. Davignon (Generale de Belgique) 
What part can the educational system play 
in  preparing people for the changeover? 
Discussion  introduced  by:  Mr  C.  de 
Boissieu  (Universite  Paris  1),  Mr 
C.  Strohm  (Association  des  Etats 
Generaux  des  Etudiants  de  !'Europe),  Mr 
G. Wijngaards (European Association  of 
Teachers) 
Debate: 
-Are  pupils  and  students  an  effective 
channel for communication to parents? 
- What  sort  of  public  education  cam-
paigns will  be  needed and when? 
-Whose opinions lead consumers? 
15.45-16.00: Coffee 
16.00: How to establish links  between the 
old prices and the new 
Discussion  introduced  by:  Mr  M-E. 
Leclerc  (ACD-LEC),  Mr  K.  Lukas 
(European  Tourism  Action  Group),  Mrs 
A.  Taylor (European Women's Lobby) 
Debate: 
- How could dual pricing displays facilitate 
the  changeover?  When  to  start  them 
and how long to maintain them 
- How to overcome conversion problems 
(between  the  national  and  the  single 
currencies) 
-Which media strategies will  be useful? 
-Will rounding be a problem? 
17.30: Closure Workshop 2 
Focus  on banking, financial services and enterprises 
The communications challenges facing the banking and financial  services industries 
are at the  heart of the  changeover  process. They  will  be  escorting  the citizen 
through the process in  at least two important senses: 
- they must reassure their customers, individual and corporate, that their financial 
interests are being safeguarded; 
- they  will  be  a  major  communications  channel  through  which  individuals  will 
learn about the single currency and how to adjust to it. 
The role of enterprises will  also be important, particularly those that handle cash 
and deal  directly with the public. 
In  this workshop, enterprises as well as  banks, savings  institutions, and other finan-
cial  services providers will  have  the opportunity to assess their communications 
tasks with key audiences, including their customers, their employees, trade unions 
and public authorities. 
Main workshop objectives: 
I.  To assess the communications roles of the financial services industry and enter-
prises during the changeover. 
2.  To  present the information needs of their clients. 
3.  To  discuss whether they are prepared and equipped for the foreseeable tasks. 
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Morning 
9.00:  .Chairman's  introduction:  Mr  H. 
Christophersen (Epsilon) 
What should be the communications prior-
ities for banks, financial  services companies 
and enterprises? 
Discussion introduced by:  Mr  M.  Monti 
(European  (Commission),  Mr  A.  Radler 
(Oppenhoff-Radler) 
How ·to  encourage  the  financial  services 
industry  and  other  enterprises  to  begin 
preparations 
Discussion introduced by: Mr W. Griiger 
(European  Association  of  Cooperative 
Banks),<Mr P. Simon (Compagnie bancaire) 
Debate: 
- Is  the scenario understood? 
-!Are  existing  communications  channels 
between  all  key  industries  and  public 
administrations up  to the task/ 
10.30-10.45: Coffee 
I 0.45:'Are  banking  and  financial  services 
equipped and  organized  for the communi-
cations challenges ahead/ 
Discussion introduced by: Mr  G. Bishop 
(Salomon  Brothers),  Mr  P.  Jennings 
(Federation lnternationale des Employes et 
Techniciens),  Mr  G. Randa (Bank Austria 
AG), Mr H.Verwilst (ASLK-CGER  Bank) 
Debate: 
-Will communications on the single  cur-
rency  strengthen  banks'  commercial 
appeal? 
-'What will  investors want to know? 
-Will the software  industry  be  able  to 
1meet demand/ 
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Afternoon 
12.15-14.15: Lunch 
14.15:  Chairman's  introduction:  Mr  G. 
Agnelli (Fiat) 
How  can  banks, financial  services  compa-
nies  and  enterprises  maintain  customer 
confidence during the changeover? 
Discussion  introduced  by:  Mr  C. 
Chapman (Financial  Times TV),  Mr. J.  M. 
de Mingo (Corte Ingles), Mr  K-P Miiller 
(Commerzbank),  Mr  D.  Livio  (Young 
Entrepreneurs for Europe) 
Debate: 
-What about  staff  training  and  internal 
communications? 
-What role for trade unions? 
-What will  corporate  clients  want  to 
know and when? 
- How to maintain a dialogue with clients 
and customers 
15.45-16.00: Coffee 
16.00: How banks, financial  services com-
panies and enterprises can  help to encour-
age  public  understanding of the single  cur-
rency 
Discussion  introduced  by:  Mr  L.  M. 
Beleza (Banco  Comercial  Portugues), ·Mr 
R.  D.  Brunowski  (Capital),  Mr  A. 
Venables (Euro Citizen Action Service) 
Debate: 
-What will  the  customers  be  worried 
about? 
-What campaigns and when? 
17.30: Closure Workshop 3 
Focus  on public administrations 
Governments and  public administrations clearly have  key  communications tasks  in 
the changeover to the single currency. They have to stimulate many diverse groups 
and  interests into beginning their preparations. Their numerous other tasks include 
creating  the  legislative  framework, defining  new  accounting  and  fiscal  rules  and 
responding sensitively to the needs of social  security and welfare recipients. 
At this workshop, public administrations will be  able to hear of the specific  infor-
mation  and  communication  needs  of their main  audiences  during the transition. 
They will also be  encouraged to think about how they should organize themselves 
so  as  to respond effectively to these needs. 
Main workshop objectives: 
I.  To identify the main communications tasks for public administrations during the 
changeover. 
2.  To  discuss the characteristics of a decentralized communications policy for the 
Union. 
3.  To discuss communications initiatives aimed at stimulating public administrations 
and  other key 'currency users' (the corporate sector, banking and  finance, tax-
payers and retailers - consumers being covered in workshop I) into beginning 
the preparations needed for a successful transition. 
4.  To identify the most important information requirements of these users during 
the various phases of the changeover. 
5.  To identify priorities and  strategies which will encourage public support for the 
single  currency. 
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Morning 
9.00:  Chairman's  introduction:  Mr  F. 
Andriessen (lnstitut de l'euro) 
What should be the communications prior-
ities for public administrations? 
Discussion  introduced by:  Mr  B. Jolivet 
(Conseil  National  du  credit),  Mr  J. Stark 
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen) 
Decentralized communications -the roles 
of Union, national and local authorities 
Discussion  introduced by:  Mr  F.  Mayer 
(Ministere  fran.;:ais  des  Finances),  Mr 
M. Oreja (European  Commission), Mr  K. 
von Wogau (European Parliament) 
Debate: 
- Can the European  institutions  be  influ-
ential  in gaining public support? 
-What  does subsidiarity mean in commu-
nications? 
-Are there  specific  needs  in  Member 
States  not  participating  in  the  first 
group? 
I 0.30-1 0.45: Coffee 
I 0.45: How can Member States face up to 
communication challenges? 
Discussion  introduced  by:  Mr  J.-M. 
Cuevas  Salvador  (Confederacion 
Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales), 
Mr  F. de Bakker (Burson  Marsteller), Mr 
C.  F.  von  Heeremann  (Deutsche 
Bauernverband) 
Debate: 
-What role for  communications  profes-
sionals? 
-What role for regional and local author-
ities and social service providers/ 
-What role for social partners? 
-What sort of coordinating body? 
-Should  each  government  appoint  a 
'Ms/Mr Single  Currency'? 
.  106 
Afternoon 
12.15-14.15: Lunch 
14.15:  Chairman's  introduction:  Mr  P. 
Dauzier (Havas) 
Period One (1996-99) 
How to encourage  key  currency  users to 
prepare for EMU 
Discussion  introduced  by:  Mr  J.  A. 
Bertelsen (FENA),  Mr  B.  Lamborghini 
(Olivetti),  Mr  E.  Liikanen  (European 
Commission),  Mr  J.  R"der  (European 
Federation of Accountants) 
Debate: 
-What are  key  currency users'  informa-
tion needs? 
-Do individual  sectors  have  particular 
requirements  e.g.  small  and  medium-
sized enterprises? 
-Are existing  communications  channels 
between government and business up to 
the task? 
15.45-16.00: Coffee 
16.00: Period Two (1999+) 
How to encourage public  support for  the 
single currency 
Discussion  introduced  by:  Sir  Samuel 
Brittan  (Financial  Times),  Mr  G. 
Verzetnisch  (Osterreichischer  Gewerk-
schaftsbund) 
Debate: 
-Will  special  strategies  be  needed  for 
particular groups e.g. taxpayers and wel-
fare  recipients? 
- How to build  on positive public opinion 
-What messages, through what channels, 
at what time? 
17.30: Closure 9.00-12.30 
9.00-9.15 
9.15-10.00 
WEDNESDAY 24 JANUARY  /996 
Plenary meeting: Conclusions of the workshops 
Venue: European  Parliament, Espace  Leopold 
Keynote  address  by  Mr K.  Hansch,  President of the  European 
Parliament 
Presentation  of the workshops'  recommendations  by  the chair-
men 
Moderator: Mr K.-P. Schmid (Die Zeit) 
I  0.00-1 0.15  Conclusions  drawn  by  Mr J.  Santer, President of the  European 
Commission 
I  0.30-12.00  A call for action by members of the Committee of Patrons: 
Messrs V. Giscard d'Estaing, F.  M. Pandolfi, C. Solchaga and 
P.Werner 
Reactions from the floor 
12.00-12.30  Closure  by  Mr  Y.-T.  de  Silguy,  Member  of  the  European 
Commission 
13.00  Press conference by  Mr. J.  Santer, President of the European 
Commission  and  Mr Y.-T.  de Silguy,  Member of the  European 
Commission 
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